Home Depot, Cambie Street, Vancouver, June 2010 (Elvin Wyly).

Homelessness
Geography 350, *Introduction to Urban Geography*
Elvin Wyly and Dan Hammel[1]

> A serious problem "...is the rooming- and lodging-house question. It is the problem of housing the homeless working people, who are obliged to live in the congested quarters of the city. They are people who have no family life and therefore constitute a very mobile group. ... in general, rooming houses accept persons by the week or month..."[2]

At first glance, this quote might seem to have been lifted from one of the scores of recent articles in Canada's national newspapers focusing on the problems of Vancouver's Downtown Eastside, with its large concentration of visible poverty and single-room occupancy (SRO) hotels. Not so: the quote comes from a book published in 1932. Even so, the words from a previous century

[1] Parts of this essay appeared as a chapter in Gary Bridge and Rowland Atkinson, eds., *The New Urban Colonialism* (Routledge, 2005).
[2] Maurice R. Davie (1932). *Problems of City Life: A Study in Urban Sociology*." New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., p. 128.

would not require that much revision to match the discourse used in today's press coverage of poor city neighborhoods, poverty, and the challenges of homelessness.

Homelessness is one of the most serious problems confronting urban theory and urban policy. The persistence of homelessness presents a direct contradiction to mainstream theories of housing and urban economics -- which offer a generally optimistic story that over the long run, market processes and societal wealth will ensure that all people are provided with such fundamental needs as shelter. The severity and durability of homelessness, across generations and among different kinds of cities, provide important measures of the failures of public policy in dealing with severe urban problems.

Today, we'll explore the urban geography of homelessness. We'll begin with a few definitions, before considering the challenges of determining how widespread and severe the problem is. Then we'll review the main barriers to solving the problem. Finally, I'll present an extended case study of what happens when urban governments face structural constraints that prevent real solutions to homelessness: the expansion of severe poverty amidst contemporary wealth leads cities to adopt a wide range of 'spatial control' laws that regulate the activities of homeless people in public space -- essentially taking away their rights to be.

Defining Homelessness

At the most basic level, homelessness is "defined by a lack of shelter in which to sleep and to perform basic activities such as bathing."[3] When we consider the full implications of each part of this definition, however, it becomes clear that a narrow, restrictive view is problematic. How strict is the definition of 'shelter'? Does a person suffer "a lack of shelter" if they have to turn to friends or extended family to sleep on a couch or in a basement?

For these reasons, most analysts now accept a wider definition of homelessness that was formalized a number of years ago at the United Nations. This definition involves two criteria:

> 1. Not having a place that can be considered "home," and thus being forced to sleep in a temporary shelter or outside, or
>
> 2. Having access to seriously deficient housing. Deficiency is here defined as "housing that is lacking in one or more of: sanitation, protection from the elements, safe water, security of tenure, affordability, personal safety, and accessibility to daily needs (particularly employment, education, and health care)."[4]

[3] Eugene McCann (2009). "Homelessness." In Derek Gregory, Ron Johnston, Geraldine Pratt, Michael J. Watts, and Sarah Whatmore, eds. *The Dictionary of Human Geography, Fifth Edition.* Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, p. 343

[4] R. Alan Walks (2006). "Homelessness, Housing Affordability, and the New Poverty." In Trudi Bunting and Pierre Filion, eds., *Canadian Cities in Transition, Third Edition*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, Canada, 419-437, quote from p. 419.

This broader definition has far-reaching implications: most crucially, it implies that the most visible signs of homelessness in a city -- people sleeping on the sidewalks at night -- represent only a small proportion of the total homeless population. The broader definition

> "embodies not only those who literally have no home, but also those who do have some form of shelter but whose present housing situation is precarious and insufficient. The difference between these situations is often conceptualized as one between *absolute* (or '*literal*') *homelessness* (not having any home) and *relative homelessness* (precarious or insufficient housing). Discrepancies in precise definitions employed by various agencies and institutions are important because alternate definitions can yield widely varying estimates of the extent of homelessness; they also support different courses of remedial action."[5]

Homelessness, defined narrowly and strictly: not having a shelter in which to sleep and to perform basic human activities such as bathing.

The broader, United Nations definition of homelessness:

1. Not having a place to call 'home,' and thus being forced to sleep outside or in a temporary shelter,

or

2. Having access to housing that is seriously deficient, in terms of sanitation, safe water, security of tenure, affordability, personal safety, and/or accessibility to employment, education, and health care.

Homelessness, therefore, should be understood in its full social, geographical, and political context. This means that the phenomenon is shaped by the rights that different people have to enjoy the benefits of "home," *as defined in the context of a particular society*. It also means that there is a continuum between absolute homelessness, at one extreme, and the very best, most secure rights to the benefits of home at the other extreme. For the case of Canadian cities, the most secure end of the continuum involves individuals and families who own their home "free and clear," with no mortgage debt obligations. At the other extreme are people suffering from absolute homelessness, those "sleeping rough" on streets, alleys, parks, and any other places where they can find refuge. Public policy responses target housing needs with distinctive approaches on various points on the continuum.

[5] Walks, "Homelessness," p. 419.

THE CONTINUUM OF HOUSING ACCESS

Source: Adapted from R. Alan Walks (2006). "Homelessness, Housing Affordability, and the New Poverty." In Trudi Bunting and Pierre Filion, eds., Canadian Cities in Transition, Fourth Edition. Don Mills, ON: Oxford Canada, 419-437, figure 25.1, p.420.

*There is a **continuum of housing access**: at one extreme, mortgage-free owners enjoy all the rights and benefits of "homefulness." At the other extreme, people sleeping rough outside suffer from absolute homelessness.*

Causes of Homelessness and Policy Responses

*The **individual model** explains homelessness in terms of the circumstances, characteristics, or choices of homeless people. In this model, homelessness is caused by personal failings.*

*The **structural model** explains homelessness as a fundamental, inescapable product of the political economy of housing markets.*

For most analysts, the structural model is crucial in explaining the persistence of homelessness even in the wealthiest societies and cities. Parts of the individual model are important in understanding <u>who</u> will be most vulnerable to the risks of homelessness.

Most explanations of homelessness fall along a continuum between two extreme positions. At one end of the continuum -- which in political terms we should label the right-hand extreme -- is the individual model, which emphasizes various circumstances, characteristics, or choices of homeless individuals. The individual model assumes that

> "personal failings -- some problem with the individual -- cause homelessness. Such failings may include physical disability, mental illness, substance abuse, criminal behaviour, delinquency, family breakup, domestic violence, inability to work, or poor job skills."[6]

Most advocates of the individual model favor public policy initiatives designed to change the attitudes or behavior of individuals suffering from homelessness; the foundational assumption of the individual model is that the housing market provides sufficient choice and opportunity, so long as individual are willing to work and make informed choices in a competitive market. The individual model is thus closely aligned with the broader theoretical and policy framework of neo-classical economics and neo-liberalism.

At the other end of the continuum is the structural model, which portrays homelessness as a fundamental and inescapable product of the political economy of housing markets. Structural models reject the 'blame the victim' tendencies of individual models, and shift attention to the pervasive, underlying failure of existing political and economic arrangements. This "political economy" perspective draws attention to the questions of power and control over economic resources: in Canada, as in every wealthy nation, there is no shortage of good, safe, high-quality housing in the society at large: the productive forces of society are clearly able to produce a vast supply of homes, many with quite luxurious amenities. The main problem is that not everyone is able to gain access to these homes.

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[6] Walks, "Homelessness," p. 420.

"...it has long been argued that Canada has more than enough existing housing stock to house everyone. It is just that the bulk of the housing space is hoarded by wealthy homeowners. ... The problem is thus not one of production, but of distribution. It follows from this analysis that homelessness will not be solved until structured inequalities in society are dealt with. Policies advocated under this model include state intervention into the labour and housing markets to reduce wage inequality and to subsidize the construction of state-run permanent housing for low-income households."[7]

Long-term solutions to homelessness require coordinated interventions to provide

1. An increased supply of affordable housing.

2. Supportive services for people with the most serious risks of homelessness.

3. Income support programs for people with insufficient resources to compete in expensive housing markets.

Most scholars who study homelessness recognize that both structural and individual perspectives are important to a full understanding of the phenomenon. Many analysts, for example, provide compelling evidence that the *overall extent and severity* of homelessness is best explained by structural factors -- changes in the nature of the economy and in public policy developments at the level of the nation-state. Yet to understand who is likely to be vulnerable to the worst extremes of absolute homelessness, we cannot ignore the individual characteristics (and, in some cases, choices or 'failings') of those who are finding it more difficult to survive in increasingly expensive, competitive housing markets.

Unfortunately, scholarly perspectives on the mutual interdependence of individual and structural models are often lost when research is discussed in the public realm. Most analysts recognize that long-term responses to homelessness must acknowledge the importance and interaction between individual and structural factors. In Canada, it is now recognized that long-term solutions require simultaneous and coordinated interventions in three areas:

1. Housing.
2. Supportive services.
3. Income.

Housing interventions recognize the significance of the structural failure of private market processes to deliver sufficient housing to the poorest and most vulnerable groups of people; supportive services are required because there are many individuals who, for various reasons, are unable to gain access to existing housing resources; and the imperative to increase the income of people at risk of homelessness is an acknowledgment of the unfortunate side effect of commodifying housing and home: gaining access to the rights of home requires enough money to exercise choice in the market.

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[7] Walks, "Homelessness," p. 421.

Measuring Homelessness

How extensive is homelessness? Counting the homeless is extremely difficult. Accurate estimates, in fact, are extremely costly to obtain: typically, major research studies designed to provide estimates of homelessness are followed by headlines drawing attention to the costs of measuring the problem -- expenditures which, presumably, could be devoted to solving the problem itself.[8] Even so, there are periodic attempts to measure the problem. Most of these efforts are limited to the far extreme end of the continuum of housing access -- absolute homelessness -- and thus provide severe under-estimates.

Measuring homelessness is expensive and difficult. But there are three main approaches:

1. Cross-sectional, or "point-in-time" estimates.

2. Use of service estimates.

3. Longitudinal survey estimates.

Even when the focus is limited to absolute homelessness, there are several ways of measuring the problem: cross-sectional or point-in-time estimates, use-of-service estimates, and longitudinal measures.

1. Cross-sectional or point-in-time estimates. This method involves sending teams of observers out into a city during a specified period of time -- usually, one over-night period -- to locate and count people sleeping outside.

2. Use of service estimates. This method involves obtaining information from staff at emergency shelters and other social service providers. Sometimes these estimates cover a short period of time (such as 24 hours), and other times the estimates cover a longer period (such as the number of unique individuals using shelters in a given year).

3. Longitudinal survey estimates. This method involves surveying a representative sample of the entire population -- people enduring homelessness, but also people with access to homes -- and asking them information about their housing histories. For some populations, homelessness is episodic (it happens during periods of crisis) rather than chronic; longitudinal survey estimates can tell us the proportion of the population that has experienced an episode of homelessness, for instance, at least once in the last four years.

Some studies attempt to combine more than one of these approaches. On March 11, 2008, more than 800 volunteers and staffers working on behalf of the Greater Vancouver Regional Steering Committee participated in the "2008 Homelessness Count." The count involved the first and second methods described above -- a 24-hour point-in-time estimate from reports of field reports/observations by teams of volunteers, and a 24-hour estimate of use of shelter services from social service providers. The 2008 count replicated methods used in previous counts

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[8] See, for example, the article in the news cooperative launched by former Vancouver Mayor Sam Sullivan's Chief of Staff, Daniel Fontaine: Mike Klassen (2010). "24 Hours Column: 'Go it Alone' Homeless Count Costs Vancouver $75,000." *City Caucus*, April 15. Available at http://www.citycaucus.com

performed in Vancouver, providing a rare, comparable view of the phenomenon over time. The estimates were troubling indeed. In all of Metro Vancouver, the estimate for March, 2008 was a total of 2,592 homeless -- an increase of 131 percent over the figure of 1,468 in 2002. For the City of Vancouver, the homeless estimate in 2008 was 1,547 -- 146 percent above the 2002 estimate of 919.[9]

Mapping Homelessness and Neoliberal Urban Policy: A Case Study

We are in the midst of a remarkable renaissance of interest in gentrification and urban reinvestment. As in the 1970s and 1980s, the transforming inner city is taken as a crucible of broader economic and cultural change. As in a previous generation, the scholarly literature is rich with impressive contributions to theory, method, policy, and politics (Hackworth, 2001, 2002a,b; Hamnett, 2002; Lambert and Boddy, 2002; Lees, 2000; Ley, 2002; Ley et al., 2002; Newman, 2003; Slater, 2002; N. Smith, 2002). And, as in the past, it's hard to walk through a city neighborhood or read the newspaper without encountering a flood of vivid illustrations of these theories in the urban landscape, in contingent intersections of culture and capital, transformation and tension. Not long ago, a Starbucks opened a few blocks from Cabrini-Green, a public housing project now almost completely surrounded by reinvestment north of downtown Chicago. In New Orleans the nation's largest private employer (Wal-Mart) is at the center of an effort to redevelop land where a public housing project once stood, with partial funding from the Federal government; intense opposition, including a lawsuit on behalf of the displaced tenants, has created a tangled storyline that one reporter dubs "A Streetcar Named No Thanks." (Hays, 2003).

The imagery is even more colorful in New York. Soho and the Village tamed, developers and art galleries are moving into Loho (a swath of the Lower East Side between East Houston and Canal) in pursuit of "the underground's underground, a radical alternative to most alternatives you can name," while newly-renovated studios rent for $3,000 a month (Hamilton, 2000; Cotter, 2002, B29). Others venture farther out on the "trendy frontier," north to the new jazz and comedy clubs of SoHa (South of Harlem, the area above West 96th) or "Eastward Ho!" into Bushwick, Brooklyn (Barnes, 2000; Pogrebin, 2002). Meanwhile, in the old industrial lands down under the Manhattan Bridge overpass (Dumbo), Bob Vila finds the perfect dilapidated brownstone to renovate on his nationally-televised home improvement show; he walks through the old building with his son, and they laugh at the handiwork left behind by squatters -- sheet rock partitions, an improvised bathroom, spare windows... "A real penthouse." Vila jokes that the squatters' work "gives you an indication about how desirable this part of New York is." (Cardwell, 2003, A18). Around the time that Vila was poking fun at the home-renovation skills and aesthetic choices of squatters, the number of homeless people staying nightly in the shelter system of the City of New York rose above 25,000. Demand for space in the shelter system rose so quickly that Martin Oesterreich, the city commissioner for homeless services who had been required by new screening procedures instituted years earlier by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani that turned many people away, used a particularly troubling metaphor to describe the lack of space.

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[9] Regional Vancouver Steering Committee on Homelessness (2009). *2008 Homelessness Count, Revised.* Vancouver, BC: Social Planning and Research Council of BC.

> "I can't screw the front door any tighter. ... We are focused on getting through what I view as a temporary crisis. That's not to say that I may not be proven wrong, and that this is instead a major shift in family homelessness." (quoted in Bernstein, 2001).

On a typical night in the winter of 2000-2001, the city's shelter system "gave beds to 10,177 children and their 8,024 adult family members, as well as 7,492 single adults." (Bernstein 2001). An unknown number of others were not able to get into the shelter system, or did not try, and wound up sleeping on the streets.

But Vila was not interested in the homeless. Vila had discovered the building through a connection to its owner, David C. Walentas, a local developer who "may be the only person to have put a New York City neighborhood on the residential map himself" with well-timed building purchases, loft conversions, strategic benevolence to arts groups, and a payment of $90,000 to persuade the Metropolitan Transit Authority to re-route a bus line (Hellman, 2002, D1). Walentas endured twenty years of false starts and failed deals in what he calls his "Stalingrad phase," before the plan came together in the last few years with new commercial tenants, loft conversions, and million-dollar condos. Now the artists who lived in his buildings through the Stalingrad years are being forced out by doubled or tripled lease rates. When he appears at a sound check before a David Bowie concert in the neighborhood, Walentas is chided by the Director of Arts for the performance space. "It must be interesting to handpick your whole neighborhood," she says. "But you can do it, David, because you're the king of Dumbo." (Hellman, 2002, D5). "I'm the mayor," he replies, adding, "Well, maybe the benevolent king." (ibid.) In a lengthy *New York Times* profile, Walentas is photographed with his wife Jane in their spacious loft in the top floor of Dumbo's centerpiece 1915 building. David and Jane are standing in front of a bookcase, and one of the volumes on the shelf is a biography of another benevolent king of New York: Robert A. Caro's (1974) *The Power Broker*.

The ironies are right there in the photograph, once we consider the narrative of that book on the shelf. *The Power Broker* is a biography, and also an urban history and geography of the landscapes around New York planned and built by Robert Moses. Moses is perhaps the second most powerful and controversial individual in the history of urban planning. He held several different positions in city government over the course of nearly fifty years, and used public funds and public authority to transform the city on a dramatic scale: he built roads, tunnels, bridges, expressways, parks, and public housing in an era when "urban renewal" meant bulldozing old neighborhoods even in the face of local protest. "He did it...by a unique combination of two qualities which he had learned in very early professional life: his rooted belief in top-down planning by the incorruptible, public-spirited civil servant, as most finely represented by the British system which he so admired; and his bitter early discovery that, in the American urban jungle at least, political connections also mattered. From these two foundations he built a system of power, influence, and patronage that made him almost impregnable -- finally to mayors, to governors, even to presidents." (Hall, 2002, 249-250). His approach was masterful, but also brutal -- he once described his plans for the Cross-Bronx Expressway as taking a "meat-axe" to the Bronx -- and it obliterated viable communities in ways that enraged many. Indeed, although Moses is widely regarded as the second most prominent figure in the history of urban planning, an even more prominent and polarizing figure was Georges-Eugène Haussman, appointed by

Louis-Napoleon Bonapart (known as Napolean III) in 1853 to reshape the public works of the city of Paris after a turbulent period of rebellion by unemployed workers and some of the middle classes. "To survive politically," Napolean III "resorted to widespread repression of alternative political movements," and one of Haussman's roles in this effort was to try to reshape the city in ways that would help the Emperor preserve power. Haussman is best remembered for the grand, monumental, and enormously wide boulevards in central Paris -- boulevards that were built by destroying vast areas of poor and working-class homes. Impressive wide boulevards offered unmistakable evidence of the power of the state, and made it easier for an army to move quickly across the city if the need should arise to put down a rebellion; the narrow, winding streets of the old poor neighborhoods had been a point of frustration for military commanders for some time. Today, when critics regard a particular plan as arrogant or disrespectful of an existing community, they will often refer to "Haussmanization," or perhaps even to Robert Moses.

Curiously enough,

> "In 1942, a lengthy evaluation of Haussman's efforts appeared in *Architectural Forum*. It documented in detail what he had done, attempted an analysis of his mistakes but sought to recuperate his reputation as one of the greatest urbanists of all time. The article was by none other than Robert Moses, who after the Second World War did to New York what Haussman had done to Paris." (Harvey, 2008, 27).

Is David Walentas, a reincarnated, privatized Robert Moses? What does it mean when a city sees rising homelessness alongside new developments of luxury condominiums, lofts, and trendy retail districts? What are the connections between the wealthy and attractive landscapes of gentrification, and what Jennifer Wolch once called the "landscapes of despair" of city homelessness? Thirty years of change have made gentrification a durable but dynamic facet of urban landscapes in North America, and indeed in cities around the world (Atkinson and Bridge 2005). In urban theory, however, long-running debates over causes and definitions have finally boiled over into frustration. Liz Bondi (1999, 255) suggests that we abandon the subject, because of "its inability to open up new insights" and she wonders if "it is time to allow it to disintegrate under the weight of these burdens." Working to move beyond the old entrenched dichotomies, Tom Slater (2003, 6), asks:

> are we really to believe that Ley (1996) ignored the economy in his comprehensive account of the emergence of the post-industrial metropolis, or that Smith's (1996) compelling assessment of the emergence of the revanchist metropolis was divorced from the impact of cultural studies?

In an even more troubling trend, important questions of theory and policy are clouded by rather mundane, straightforward empirical issues. Carrying on a tradition from the 1960s, for instance, many policy-oriented researchers are drawing sharp distinctions among physical types of reinvestment (classical 'invasion-succession,' new construction on old industrial lands, loft conversion, etc.) to reconcile their ethical concerns over a rich menu of new government programs to promote redevelopment, 'new markets,' and income-mixing in the inner city. Many want to support these policies so long as they avoid what has wrongly been used as the litmus

test of gentrification -- direct, conflict-ridden displacement of existing working-class or poor residents. No matter its physical form, gentrification is fundamentally about the reconstruction of the inner city to serve middle- and upper-class interests. When it avoids direct displacement, the process usually involves middle-class or developer subsidies that cannot be seen in isolation from cutbacks in housing assistance to the poor and other attacks on the remnants of the welfare state.

What are the different types of reinvestment in the city? How unequal are these different places? What has changed in the 1990s? Are other cities seeing the same reactionary class politics and entrepreneurial vengeance portrayed in Mike Davis's "fortress Los Angeles" and Neil Smith's vengeful, "revanchist" New York? In this essay we offer empirical answers to these questions. Neoliberal policies in housing, social policy, and public space have created a complex new urban landscape -- but it is possible to map this urban hierarchy and a few of its consequences.



Population Change in Gentrified Neighborhoods, 1990-2000. The interaction of in-migration, displacement, and transitions in household composition inscribes complex variations in population growth. Yet almost all of the gentrified neighborhoods identified in our field surveys have enjoyed a remarkable resurgence in terms of their attractiveness to capital. Between 1993 and 2000, private, conventional mortgage capital to home-buyers in these neighborhoods expanded more than twice as fast as the suburban rate. *Source:* authors' field surveys, and data from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census of Population and Housing.

Mapping the New Urban Frontier

In the last ten years we have assembled a simple database of gentrification in large U.S. cities. Our methods involve a combination of fieldwork, archival research, and multivariate statistical analysis (for detailed explanations see Hammel and Wyly, 1996 and Wyly and Hammel, 1999). We strive for comparable, consistent, and conservative measures to identify neighborhoods that

a) endured disinvestment a generation ago, and b) have since undergone the changes that nearly all researchers would agree are worth studying under the label 'gentrification.' A key part of our fieldwork involves "ground-truthing" the census data so often used to describe urban growth and change; after several years of investigation we are now able to offer some comparative evidence from twenty-three metropolitan areas (Figure 4). Our list includes a wide variety of cities -- places where reinvestment boomed in the 1970s or even earlier, and others where rapid changes have appeared more recently.

A New Urban System?

The aggressive promotion of transnational corporate globalization and a domestic recipe of privatized, market-oriented social policy have created a new, "neoliberal" urbanism -- a network of urban processes shaped by a paradoxical, state-driven "return to the original axioms of liberalism" in the tradition of eighteenth-century political economy (N. Smith, 2002, 429). Deep public-private subsidies are given to demonstrate the efficiency of unregulated markets, while substantial funds are spent to demolish the redistributive infrastructure built from the 1930s to the 1960s. Measuring the imprint of these changes in specific neighborhoods requires balancing the productive tensions among several literatures -- not just critical social theory inquiry into questions of justice and difference (Harvey, 2000; Merrifield and Swyngedouw, 1997), but also the historical and positivist quantitative-revolution work on urban system development (Berry, 1964, 1972; Pred, 1977) and the richly-textured case studies of social and spatial relations in specific city neighborhoods (Beauregard, 1990; Bennett, 1998; Hammel, 1999; Slater, 2003; Ley, 1981). We are certainly not the first to suggest such a synthesis. Don Mitchell (1997) offers the best example, in "The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and Implications of Anti-Homeless Laws in the United States." Mitchell argues that the widely-cited realities and myths of accelerated capital mobility have forced cities into fundamentally new ways of trying to attract investment in a world where places seem to be rendered interchangeable by wage competition and race-to-the-bottom subsidies:

> ...the ideology of globalization allows local officials, along with local business people and property owners, to argue that they have no choice but to prostrate themselves before the god Capital, offering not just tax and regulatory inducements, but also extravagant convention centers, downtown tourist amusements, up-market, gentrified restaurants and bar districts, and even occasional public investment in such amenities as museums, theaters, and concert halls.... When capital is seen to have no *need* for any particular place, then cities do what they can to make themselves so attractive that capital...will *want* to locate there (Mitchell, 1997, p. 304, emphasis added).

The implication is clear. In classical theories of urban system development, cities fought through constant product innovation to reap the profits of locally-distinctive exports and to thus claw their way up the urban hierarchy. Now the competition is an innovative race to create an interesting and attractive -- and *safe and sanitized* -- playground for the professional elites employed by global capital.

> “In city after city concerned with ‘livability,’ with, in other words, making urban centers attractive to both footloose capital and to the footloose middle classes, politicians and managers have turned to...a legal remedy that seeks to cleanse the streets of those left behind by globalization and other secular changes in the economy by simply erasing the spaces in which they must live....” (Mitchell, 1997, 305).

Mitchell uses the work of a legal philosopher, Jeremy Waldron, to draw out the full implications of these kinds of policies.

> “‘One way of describing the plight of a homeless individual might be to say that there is no place governed by a private property rule where he is allowed to be’ (Waldron, 1991, 299). Homeless people can only be on private property -- in someone’s house, in a restaurant bathroom -- by the express permission of the owner of that property. While that is also true for the rest of us, the rest of us nonetheless have at least once place which we are (largely) sovereign. We do not need to ask permission to use the toilet or shower or to sleep in a bed. Conversely, the only place homeless people may have even the possibility of sovereignty in their own actions is on common or public property. As Waldron explains, in a ‘libertarian paradise’ where *all* property is privately held, a homeless person simply could not be. ‘Our society saves the homeless from this catastrophe only by virtue of the fact that some of its territory is held as collective property and made available for common use. The homeless are allowed to *be* -- provided they are on the streets, in the parks, or under bridges.’ (Waldron, 1991, 300).” (Mitchell, 1997, 310).

Don Mitchell's analysis of homelessness as the "annihilation of space by law":

1. When mobile capital seems to have no need for any particular place, cities try to make capital want to come to town.

2. Cities thus try to make themselves attractive to footloose capital and footloose middle and upper classes, emphasizing 'livability' and 'quality of life.'

3. City politicians and managers thus turn to legal remedies that cleanse the streets of those left behind by globalization -- erasing the spaces in which homeless people must life.

4. The result is a proliferation of laws that claim only to ban unpleasant behaviors in public places. But for people with no private spaces (homes) to which to retreat, these laws criminalize essential human activities. By eliminating the spaces in which homeless people are allowed to perform basic human activities, these laws erase the spaces in which homeless people are allowed to be, to live.

Urban geography is thus at the heart of why homelessness is so fundamental. In public discussions of homelessness, many public officials or business representatives will draw attention to the behavioral problems of homeless individuals, and the very real unpleasant consequences for local homeowners or business owners when a particular part of a city has a significant number of people who are homeless. This is why there is often very broad support for city councils when they pass legislation that bans certain types of behaviors in public space. It seems to be eminently reasonable to ask that people not perform private bodily functions on the sidewalk, or in a park in a busy section of the city. But these laws only seem reasonable because geography is being ignored: prohibiting these activities is a very minor inconvenience for those of us who have private places -- our homes, or our workplaces, or a university where we work or study and where security guards will not usher us out the door, or a restaurant where we've made a purchase so that the owner will allow us to 'use the facilities.' But what if you do not have access to these places? Waldron draws out the implications:

"What is emerging -- and it is not just a matter of fantasy -- is a state of affairs in which a million or more citizens have no place to perform elementary human activities like urinating, washing, sleeping, cooking, eating, and standing around. Legislators voted for by people who own private places in which they can do these things

> are increasingly deciding to make public places available only for activities other than these primal human tasks. The streets and the subways, they say, are for commuting from home to office. They are not for sleeping; sleeping is what one does at home. The parks are for recreations like walking and informal ball-games, things for which one's own yard is a little too confined. Parks are not for cooking or urinating; again, these are things one does at home. Since the public and private are complementary, the activities performed in public are the complement of those performed in private. This complementarity works fine for those who have the benefit of both sorts of places. However, it is disastrous for those who must live their whole lives on common land. If I am right about this, it is one of the most callous and tyrannical exercises of power in modern times by a (comparatively) rich and complacent majority against a minority of their less fortunate human beings." (Waldron, 1991, 301-302).

Mitchell and Waldron offer magisterial theoretical analyses drawn from philosophies of justice and conceptions of the public, along with critical examinations of court decisions and legislation. But this perspective also has important lessons for quantitative empirical studies of neighborhood change. As urban politics has created the revanchist city -- a vengeful world marked by "a defense and reconstruction of the lines of identity privilege ... in the context of rising economic insecurity" among the white, Anglo bourgeoisie (N. Smith, 1997, 129) -- we should expect to see a discernible regional geography in the backlash against the homeless, poor, and racialized minorities.

> *The proliferation of anti-homeless laws is a prime example of* ***geography abuse****. When a society is unable to solve a difficult problem of social, economic, and political inequality, geography often provides a reassuring illusion of decisive action: if you can't solve the problem, move it around.*

Part of this story can be captured in a simple comparison of the class character of gentrification and some of the more blatantly revanchist local policies documented by Mitchell (1997), N. Smith (1996, 1997), and Waldron (1991). Between 1993 and 2000, about 26 thousand high-income households filed requests for loans to buy homes in gentrified neighborhoods.[10] These inner-city elite are only a tiny fraction of wealthy buyers in the overall metropolitan housing market, but the new urban frontier accounts for a substantial share of those choosing the central city -- more than a fifth in Chicago and Philadelphia, and half in Boston. To test whether elite gentrification worsens localized revanchist practices of discipline and surveillance, we turn to the extensive survey of homeless advocates and service providers conducted jointly by the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty and the National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH/NLCHP, 2002). We matched our case study cities to the report's Prohibited Conduct Chart, a depressing compendium of local ordinances codifying the kinds of principles and (often unconstitutional) legal mechanisms used to mask the state's

[10] We used mortgage disclosure data (FFIEC, 1994-2001) to identify the top tenth of the distribution of inflation-adjusted incomes reported by all home purchase applicants in our 23 metropolitan areas. Cutoffs for the 90th percentile range from $100,000 in St. Louis (in 2000 dollars) to $231,000 in San Francisco.

failure to deal with homelessness. Here, we focus on ordinances involving curfews, or banning the following activities: spitting, urination and defecation in public; begging in public places; "aggressive" panhandling; sleeping in public; camping in public; loitering, loafing, and vagrancy; and obstruction of sidewalks and public places.[11] As Mitchell points out, most of these activities are the kinds of things a homeless person simply *must do* in order to live -- and yet this is precisely what inspires indignation and activism among the urban professional classes. Local authorities in any city usually move quickly against street people doing any of these things; but our reasoning is that the policies are formalized only under certain circumstances, and that gentrification is one of the processes that helps to broaden the base of support for explicit, city-wide 'quality of life' ordinances.

The criminalization of homelessness has become a powerful form of traveling urban theory (Table 1). All but one of our cities have explicit ordinances against two or more of the specified activities; the sole exception (Chicago) ranks as one of the nation's "meanest cities" for homeless people, on the basis of anti-homeless practices not captured in formal ordinances.[12] Six of the cities ban five of the specified activities, while one (Atlanta) bans six. There is a broad-brush correlation with the strength of elite gentrification. Of the cities ranked in the top ten according to elite reinvestment, seven also achieved top rank on local anti-homeless ordinances -- defined here either as a "meanest city" designation or banning five or more of the specified activities. By contrast, the bottom thirteen cities include only three meeting the same criteria: Atlanta, Oakland, and Indianapolis. The latter seems to reflect an unusually severe political backlash against the poor,[13] while Oakland's bans must be seen in the context of intense housing inflation and a race-to-the-bottom in anti-homeless policies throughout the Bay Area. The other anomaly is famous for an ordinance tailored to the imperatives of a low-density, auto-reliant built environment. In Atlanta, it is a crime to cut across or loiter in a parking lot unless you have lawfully parked your own car there; an estimated 18,000 people are cited annually for assorted quality of life infractions (NCH/NLCHP, 2002, 15). If we set aside the residuals of Atlanta, Oakland, and Indianapolis, the pattern is fairly clear: gentrified enclaves claim a prominent place in elite housing markets where municipal policy incorporates provisions designed to cleanse the city of certain people and behaviors.

[11] Many municipalities have established ordinances banning one or more of these activities only in specified districts. To maintain the most conservative approach, our tabulations are restricted to *citywide* ordinances banning the specified activities.

[12] In Chicago, "police are using old, vague ordinances and charging people with vagrancy, begging, loitering, etc. ... The City has also closed and even destroyed many transient hotels as part of conscious gentrification plans to recreate neighborhoods. ... Sweeps of homeless individuals are conducted whenever there are major events in the downtown area." (NCH/NLCHP, 2002, 133-134).

[13] Six years ago, Indianapolis went so far as to ban the homeless from voting, before advocates managed to convince the state legislature to pass a law reaffirming voting rights. One homeless shelter requires those admitted to undress and don prison-style orange jumpsuits. (NCH/NLCHP, 2002, 135).

Table 1. Elite Locational Choice and Revanchist Municipal Policy.

	Share of affluent central-city buyers choosing gentrified neighborhoods	Prohibited Activities†									
		minor curfew	spitting	urination or defecation	begging	"aggressive" panhandling	sleeping	camping	loitering, loafing, or vagrancy	obstruction of sidewalks or public places	Ranked as "meanest city"
Boston	49.9%					x	x			x	
Philadelphia	23.9%	x	x	x		x				x	
Chicago	22.5%								x		2002
Milwaukee	18.8%					x			x	x	
Washington, DC	17.5%	x				x			x		
San Francisco	16.5%	x			x	x				x	1996, 2002
Seattle	14.8%			x		x				x	1996
Baltimore	13.3%		x	x		x			x	x	2002
Minneapolis-St. Paul*	11.7%	x	x		x			x		x	
St. Louis	9.7%	x	x			x			x	x	
Detroit	5.7%				x				x	x	
Cincinnati	4.9%					x				x	
Dallas	4.5%	x		x		x	x				
New Orleans	3.6%				x		x				
San Diego	3.5%				x	x				x	
Atlanta	3.4%	x	x	x		x		x		x	
Oakland	2.5%		x	x			x	x		x	
Denver	2.3%		x	x						x	
Kansas City**	1.1%	x	x			x				x	
Indianapolis	1.1%		x		x	x			x	x	
San Jose	0.6%	x		x						x	
Phoenix	0.1%					x	x	x		x	
Fort Worth	0.1%	x			x					x	

†Bans on begging, sleeping, camping, and loitering/loafing/vagrancy include only city-wide ordinances.
*Prohibited activities refer only to Minneapolis; St. Paul not included in NCH/NLCHP survey.
**Prohibited activities refer only to Kansas City, MO; Kansas City, KS not included in NCH/NLCHP survey.

Sources: Authors' fieldwork; FFIEC (1994-2001); NCH/NLCHP (2002).

Atop the Revanchist Hierarchy

Our data and methods make it hazardous to draw clear causal links in the emergence of the new neoliberal American urbanism. But as a purely descriptive tool, the approach offers valuable insights into the kinds of places created by reinvestment, uneven metropolitan development, and interactions of city, state, and federal policy. If we were to update Berry's (1972) *City Classification Handbook* for the neoliberal years of the 1990s, one way to begin is a standard multivariate numerical taxonomy. Consider a simple brew of contextual variables -- measures of urban growth, housing affordability, segregation and inequality, the prevalence of anti-homeless ordinances -- along with a few basic features of gentrified areas.[14] Our choice of variables is certainly open to critique, and some of these measures are at the center of tempestuous debates over epistemology, methodology, policy, and politics. But the results of a simple cluster analysis do offer a systematic, empirical way to analyze one element of the revanchist city (Table 2).[15]

[14] Unless otherwise noted in Table 2, all measures are calculated for central cities. The prohibited activities measure excludes curfew and spitting ordinances. The housing wage variable measures the hourly pay required for a full-time worker to afford the fair market rent for a two-bedroom apartment in each metropolitan area.

[15] Our taxonomy was developed using the FASTCLUS procedure in SAS, a non-hierarchical, iterative disjoint clustering procedure that minimizes within-group Euclidian distances based on orthogonal, standardized quantitative measures. The overall R-squared (measuring how well variables can be predicted from clusters) is 0.68; the ratio of between-cluster to within-cluster variance $[R^2/(1-R^2)]$ is encouragingly high (above 2) for most variables, with the notable exception of prohibited activities (0.42). The low value for this indicator persists through dozens of alternative specifications with a variety of other variables, indicating that these types of ordinances have proliferated across many kinds of cities.

Boston, San Jose, and Detroit each stand out as distinctive centers in classes by themselves, shaped by uniquely extreme configurations of elite gentrification, housing inflation, or new development in close proximity to the gated communities for the poor (correctional facilities) portrayed by Harvey (2000, 155). In the well-established enclaves of Chicago, Philadelphia, and Washington, elite reinvestment falls short of Boston, but in the context of similarly sharp divisions of race and class. In other cities segregation is similarly pronounced, but metropolitan decentralization dilutes otherwise important inner-city changes (Atlanta, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, New Orleans, St. Louis). And the classification clearly highlights the racialized contours of the new urban frontier in cities segregated along white/black lines or anglo/latino divisions.

Nevertheless, anti-homeless ordinances have proliferated across all of these categories. As Atkinson (2003) has shown for the English case, urban policy entails an intricate and highly contextual fabric, with various “strands of revanchism” woven into governance structures at various scale. Gentrification is generally correlated with one strand -- explicit anti-homeless laws -- but most of the variation among cities comes from the broader urban context in which reinvestment and revanchism have emerged.

Table 2. A Classification of the Gentrified Urban System.

Interpretation	Pacific Exclusion	Disciplined Decentralization	Elite Revanchist Cities		Latino Segregation		Gated Communities for the Poor	
Variable	San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle	Atlanta, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, New Orleans, St. Louis	Boston	Chicago, Philadelphia, Washington	San Jose	Dallas, Denver, Kansas City, Oakland, Phoenix	Indianapolis, Minneapolis-St. Paul	Detroit
	Mean values							
Ratio of central city to metropolitan population growth, 1990-2000	0.7	-1.2	0.5	-0.4	1.2	0.5	-0.1	-1.8
Number of prohibited activities, 2000-2001	3	3	3	2	2	2.8	3.5	3
Ratio of "underclass" population to resident professional workforce, 1990	0.2	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.4	1.7
African American share of population 2000	9.1	54.8	27.7	47.7	4.1	22.8	21.8	82.8
Hispanic share of population, 2000	14.9	4.1	14.4	14.1	30.2	26.5	5.8	5.0
Black-White dissimilarity index, 2000	57.3	70.6	66.4	79.5	38.0	60.3	56.1	72.8
Hispanic-White dissimilarity index, 2000	48.1	42.2	51.1	60.9	51.9	57.2	43.5	60.0
Housing wage for 2-bedroom apartment, metro, 2001 ($)	22.9	12.2	18.8	15.4	30.6	15.9	12.1	12.8
Share of elite city buyers choosing gentrified neighborhoods, 1993-2000	11.6	9.0	49.9	21.3	0.6	2.1	6.4	5.7
White black mortgage loan denial ratio in gentrified neighborhoods, 1993-2000	1.8	2.3	1.8	2.6	3.6	2.2	2.2	3.2
Share of gentrified neighborhood population in correctional institutions, 2000	1.3	0.5	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.0	4.4	14.6
Share of gentrified neighborhood population homeless, 1990	1.8	1.1	0.7	1.3	0.3	0.3	2.1	0.1

Data Sources: FFIEC (1994-2001), Kasarda (1993), Mumford Center (2002), NLHC (2001), NLCHP (2002), U.S. Bureau of the Census (2001), Wyly and Hammel (2003).

A Taxonomy of Neighborhood Inequality

Inter-city comparisons tell only part of the story. Can we identify systematic contrasts *within* and *among* cities in the kinds of inequalities inscribed by reinvestment? Answering this question is empirically simple (but methodologically provocative) if we harness the methods of the target-marketing industry. We matched our field surveys to the Neighborhood Change Database developed by the Urban Institute (Geolytics, 2003), which provides a limited set of variables for 1970 through 2000 for constant neighborhood boundaries. We extracted a set of housing and

population measures to highlight changes in inequality during the 1990s.[16] Then we used a standard factorial-ecology approach to eliminate multicollinearity and define six composite dimensions of neighborhood restructuring (Table 3).[17] Another multivariate numerical taxonomy (using the rotated component scores) gives us a dozen distinct types among the 352 tracts identified in our field investigations (Table 4).[18]

Table 3. Principal Components Analysis of Gentrified Neighborhoods, 1990-2000.

	Loadings on (varimax) rotated components					
	I	**II**	**III**	**IV**	**V**	**VI**
Interpretation	**African American** Segregation	Development	**Housing** Tenure	Institutions	**Latino** Segregation	Polarization
Variable						
Change in Housing Units, 1990-2000		0.88				
Change in Population, 1990-2000		0.79				
Non-Hispanic African American, 1990	0.94					
Hispanic, 1990					0.94	
Group Quarters, 1990		0.52		0.58		-0.41
Correctional Institutions, 1990				0.91		
Homeless Population, 1990		0.80				
Poverty Rate, 1990	0.51	0.51				
White Per Capita Income, 1989 dollars						0.74
White-Black Ratio of Per Capita Income, 1989						0.68
Homeownership, 1990			0.86			
Vacancy Rate, 1990		0.61				
Non-Hispanic African American, 2000	0.95					
Hispanic, 2000					0.95	
Group Quarters, 1990				0.68		
Correctional Institutions, 2000				0.92		
White married couples without children, 2000	-0.54		0.63			
Homeownership, 2000			0.97			
White Renters, 2000			-0.93			
Black Renters, 2000	0.95					
Vacancy Rate, 2000						
Percentage of total variance	20.1	17.2	14.7	10.7	8.1	6.9

Notes:
1. All variables are percentages unless otherwise indicated.
2. Loadings -0.40 to +0.40 not shown.

Data Source: Geolytics (2003).

[16] The detailed long-form sample data for 2000 are not yet available in this dataset, so we are limited to the basic measures in the full-count census of the entire population.
[17] The factor model is fairly robust, with the six-component solution accounting for 78 percent of the variance in the original 21 measures. More than half of the original variables achieve communalities over 0.80, and only three fall short of 0.60.
[18] The overall R-squared is 0.68. The ratio of between- to within-cluster variance is over 2.0 for all components except III (housing tenure, with a ratio of 1.16) and VI (polarization, 1.25).

Table 4. A Market Segmentation of Gentrified Inequalities.

(a) Main Clusters

	Vanilla Playgrounds	Gold Coast Enclaves	Racialized Redevelopment	Precarious Diversity	Latino Frontier
Sample Neighborhoods	Capitol Hill, Denver Printer's Row, Chicago Wrigleyville, Chicago Western Addition, San Francisco	Capitol Hill, Washington DC Society Hill, Philadelphia Summit Hill, St. Paul Back Bay, Boston	Bolton Hill, Baltimore Shaw, Washington DC Downtown Detroit Corryville, Cincinnati	Eads Park, St. Louis Grant Park, Atlanta North Oakland Black Pearl, New Orleans	Naglee Park, San Jose Lower Greenville, Dallas Lincoln Park, Denver Mission District, San Francisco
Cluster Number	12	9	5	3	1
Number of tracts	137	94	46	24	24
			Unweighted Mean Values		
Change in Housing Units, 1990-2000	10	12	14	2.4	9.2
Change in Population, 1990-2000	15	13	17	2.0	10
Homeless Population, 1990	2.0	0.29	1.3	0.41	0.64
Poverty Rate, 1990	19	12	34	20	28
White Per Capita Income, 1989 (dollars)	21,526	33,168	20,883	23,373	15,810
White-Black Ratio of Per Capita Income, 1989	1.8	2.3	2.7	2.3	1.8
Non-Hispanic African American, 2000	13	9.0	55	55	9.0
Hispanic, 2000	8.4	6.2	6.8	3.8	43
Group Quarters, 1990	7.0	3.6	5.9	2.4	2.7
Correctional Institutions, 2000	0.10	0.27	0.85	0.31	0.04
Homeownership, 2000	17	42	21	49	23
White Renters, 2000	81	56	70	43	72
Vacancy Rate, 2000	7.3	7.3	12	8.9	7.1

Note: All figures are percentages except white per capita income and white-black income ratio.

(b) Outliers / Small Clusters

	Loft Lightning		Central Citadels	Cells and Apartments	Downtown Sweep	Yuppies in Training	Elite Polarization
Neighborhoods	West Loop Gate Chicago		Downtown Minneapolis Downtown Indianapolis	Renaissance Center / Greektown, Detroit SoMa, San Francisco Horton Plaza, San Diego	Greektown, Chicago Grand Ave. El, Chicago Downtown Philadelphia Downtown Washington	Longwood Medical / Academic area, Boston Boston University, Boston Georgetown, Washington Hyde Park, Chicago	Central City, New Orleans Mount Adams, Cincinnati Belltown, Seattle Downtown Dallas
Cluster Number	4	10	7	2	8	11	6
Number of tracts	1	1	2	3	4	11	5
				Unweighted Mean Values			
Change in Housing Units, 1990-2000	610	865	8.6	32	225	8.6	101
Change in Population, 1990-2000	684	535	77	23	108	15	89
Homeless Population, 1990	34	84	0.0	11	46	1.0	1.2
Poverty Rate, 1990	39	69	12	24	53	29	30
White Per Capita Income, 1989 dollars	30,670	14,946	45,358	20,222	10,053	10,103	54,377
White-Black Ratio of Per Capita Income, 1989	0.55	2.3	3.6	1.7	2.0	1.2	15
Non-Hispanic African American, 2000	7.7	28	33	40	20	13	22
Hispanic, 2000	5.0	4.7	3.1	15	5.5	7.8	6.1
Group Quarters, 1990	0.0	25	44	59	22	61	3.0
Correctional Institutions, 2000	0.0	0.0	35	51	0.0	0.0	0.0
Homeownership, 2000	88	61	26	17	44	26	22
White Renters, 2000	11	36	74	80	51	73	75
Vacancy Rate, 2000	21	13	13	12	16	6.9	14

Note: All figures are percentages except white per capita income and white-black income ratio.

In the target-marketing industry, of course, this kind of analysis is premised on consumption, market potential, and the commodification of place -- distilled into catchy labels like 'money and brains,' 'bohemian mix,' or 'single-city blues' (a few categories in the consumer segmentation products offered by Claritas, Inc.). But this act of geographical objectification can also be used strategically to highlight the inequalities and dilemmas of gentrification. Our analysis reveals five main types of places inscribed by reinvestment, and seven smaller categories with unique, extreme configurations (Table 4). Almost two-fifths of neighborhoods in our study are dominated by dynamic retail and residential districts popular among young, mostly white renters. Another quarter are the classic gold-coast enclaves, such as Washington's Capitol Hill, Philadelphia's Society Hill, and Boston's Back Bay. A generation of reinvestment has thoroughly reshaped vanilla playground and gold coast neighborhoods, so in most of these places there is no longer much concern over displacement of the poor, who were pushed out years ago; current tensions typically involve competitive struggles among various gentrifiers (Hackworth, 2002a, 2002b). The older, familiar lines of class conflict have moved deeper into the inner city.

In about one-seventh of all neighborhoods, gentrification is best understood as racialized redevelopment, with greatly magnified race-class inequalities in African American communities. In another group of neighborhoods these changes are buffered and delayed by comparatively high rates of Black homeownership, sustaining what is often an uneasy community diversity. Reinvestment and class transformation involve white-Anglo/Latino divisions in about seven percent of the neighborhoods.

But it is in the exceptional neighborhoods, marked by extreme and dynamic social-statistical profiles, where revanchist neoliberalism inscribes the most vivid urban ecologies. In one place (the near west side of Chicago) centralized housing demand has turbocharged the redevelopment of a latter-day zone in transition, raplacing a mixed area of small wholesalers, suppliers, and old apartment houses with a suddenly-trendy "West Loop Gate" of lofts, condo towers, and an upscale entertainment corridor. In a handful of other neighborhoods, downtown reinvestment coincides with county jails and other correctional facilities, a reminder that the creation of attractive middle-class living spaces is never entirely unrelated to the infrastructures of discipline required to protect (some) people from deindustrialization, poverty, discrimination, homelessness, and other externalities of contemporary neoliberal globalization (Gilmore, 2002). A similar but converse process is underway in a few places where homeless shelters, SROs, and dilapidated homes are replaced by new apartments and downtown office or retail districts. In some cases the affordable housing and social services are relocated with no net loss, but in the last decade this outcome has become quite rare. Elsewhere, reinvestment is tied to elite colleges and universities, many of them either private or dealing with government mandates to respond to short-term market imperatives. In a few places reinvestment has created truly extraordinary cases of polarization of wealth, poverty, and displacement.

We All Know the Term for this Trend. Gentrifying neighborhoods in Cincinnati are on the front lines between poverty and reinvestment, and local variants of neoliberal urban redevelopment shaped the context in which policing practices led to a violent uprising in April, 2001. Genesis Redevelopment, Inc. is across the street from the Laurel Homes, the city's oldest public housing project and a landmark of the West End; our quantitative analysis identifies the neighborhood as an instance of racialized redevelopment (see Table 4). Genesis began receiving federal funds through city government agencies in 1991 to redevelop 130 homes. Eight years and $800,000 later they had rehabbed their own offices and 11 homes, some belonging to board members. The scandal reached all the way to the city council (Anglen and Curnutte, 2000; Osborne, 2000; Korte, 2001). Meanwhile, the Laurel Homes were targeted in a federally-funded redevelopment plan (HOPE VI, 'Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere') that facilitates the gentrification of severely distressed inner-city projects where local reinvestment boosts demand for market-rate units. The Laurel and adjoining Lincoln Court Homes are being upgraded to include 835 mixed-income rental units and 250 for-sale homes (Community Builders, 2002). A former middle school teacher whose students lived in the complex recalls telling them that "inner city communities like the West End and Over-the-Rhine are not valued by the city planners until a trend occurs, which brings the young, upwardly mobile, and professional back to the inner city as residents. We all know the term for this trend: it's called 'gentrification.'" (Mincey, 2001). Even the disinvested Over-the-Rhine neighborhood, the epicenter of the 2001 uprising, has seen incipient signs of gentrification. Population has continued to decline and abandoned buildings still mar the landscape, but displacement of long-time residents was cited as one of the background conditions that shaped local reactions to the police shooting of an unarmed teenager, Timothy Thomas. Policing and law involve an explicit spatiality, however, to discipline the neighborhood. The area was the focus of a unique city ordinance that allowed police to ban suspected drug users from a "drug exclusion zone." (Lazare, 2001). The ordinance was eventually overturned in federal court, but in five years of enforcement police used the law to ban more than 300 people, some of them residents (Grieco, Hills and Modic, 2001, p. A1). One homeless man accumulated about a year of jail time through his repeated returns to the area for food and shelter. The law also swept up a grandmother arrested on charges of marijuana trafficking; although her case was thrown out of court, the banishment from the drug-free zone remained, preventing her from walking her grandchildren to school. Police now lament the loss of the ordinance: one official says, "It worked, and they took it away." (ibid.) Over-the-Rhine has become a vivid example of contemporary neoliberal inequalities, "a neighborhood where farmers sell mushrooms for $160 a pound at the Findlay Market within sight of drug dealers peddling their own herbs." (ibid.) *Photograph by Dan Hammel.*

From Freedmen's Town to Mars. Following the Civil War, freedmen's towns developed in many Texas cities as places where former slaves could live in relative safety, albeit horrendous squalor. In Dallas and Houston, these areas evolved into poor but vibrant centers for Black culture and business, and after the 1920s they were often compared to Manhattan's Harlem. Recent gentrification pressures have wrought substantial changes in these communities. In the State-Thomas area of Dallas, most evidence of the history of African American settlement has been obliterated, and most of the residents who lived there before 1990 are long gone. Many of the (mostly white) gentrifiers moving in during the late 1980s feared overdevelopment and the loss of the area's historic character, and thus worked closely with the city planning office to draft detailed guidelines and restrictions. A historian who worked on the guidelines reported measuring setbacks on Manhattan's Upper West Side, and the planning office borrowed heavily from similar plans in Seattle and Toronto (Griffin, 2002). Yet much of the neighborhood resembles an eerie attempt to recreate Philadelphia's Society Hill at a larger architectural scale. For its part the city made State-Thomas its first tax increment financing district in 1989, pouring in $18 million in public infrastructure subsidies to leverage a remarkable quarter-billion of private investment (City of Dallas, 2001). The development shown here (Drexel Court) is one of the few that did *not* involve direct public funds. Our quantitative analysis identifies this neighborhood as an instance of elite polarization (see Table 4). The scale and pace of change have stunned recent arrivals and longtime observers alike. One ninety-six year old lifetime resident said "It feels like I woke up one morning on Mars." (Griffin, 2002). *Photograph by Dan Hammel.*

Each of these categories, and indeed each place, deserves the kind of politically and geographically intimate analysis of Atkinson (2003), or Beauregard (1990), Bennett (1998), Ley (1981), or Slater (2003). But even our superficial sketch of the comparative outlines of inner-city transformation is illuminating. Moreover, this neighborhood analysis is closely linked to the metropolitan view provided earlier (Table 2). Chicago and San Francisco, both distinguished by particularly strict anti-homeless regimes, have the largest and most diverse mix of gentrified neighborhoods. Elite revanchist cities tend to the extremes, with over-representation of gold coast enclaves and racial redevelopment or downtown sweep neighborhoods (while in Boston elite university districts compete with gold coast environments). In cities of disciplined decentralization, we find fewer gold coasts, but more areas of racialized redevelopment and

precarious diversity. Not surprisingly, Latino-segregated cities have more Latino frontier gentrified areas, but several also have a mix of gold coast enclaves and vanilla playgrounds.

Conclusions

In the early 1990s, the onset of recession prompted speculation that gentrification was dead. The subsequent boom proved once again that gentrification endures as an empirically limited but theoretically indispensable reflection of contemporary urbanization. The long economic boom of the 1990s thus wove gentrification more tightly together with privatization, globalized city competition, welfare reform, and all other parts of the fabric of neoliberal governance. And more than ever before, gentrification has been woven into public policy, as reason to obey market forces or as a tool to direct them in hopes of restructuring the urban landscape. Trumpeted under the friendly banners of regeneration, renewal, or revitalization, many of these placebo policies fail in their boosterish goals; but even successful leverage of private capital tends worsens housing affordability in a neoliberal climate of strategic deregulation. Even when gentrifiers have genuinely inclusive intentions in their newfound inner-city homes, their arrival accelerates local market pressures interacting with urban policy in a climate of austerity, economic discipline, and a consistent preference for spatial mechanisms that avoid questioning underlying societal inequalities (Mitchell, 1997). In short, the triumph of neoliberalism has altered the context and consequences of gentrification, creating new inequalities and locally-distinctive strands of revanchism (Atkinson, 2003). And yet these local distinctions are only minor variations on a general theme: private property is what matters most to those with sufficient income to compete in the urban real estate market. Middle-class support for anti-homeless ordinances has criminalized not only a wide range of activities deemed inappropriate for public space; these ordinances have essentially criminalized the act of being -- of living -- as a person without a home. In the most troubling new manifestation of this policy movement, some municipalities have responded to non-profit and church groups' provision of free food in public places with extremely harsh laws: Las Vegas made it illegal to provide free food to people in public parks (Heynen and Mitchell, forthcoming).

Our effort to map a neoliberal urban system is a deliberate provocation, with serious risks. As in the world-cities literature, the approach is "poised somewhere on a conceptual and epistemological borderland where positivism, structuralism, and essentialism meet." (M.P. Smith, 1999, 119). And it is built on the shaky foundations of partitional thinking. The choice of variables defines the mathematical space that is then mechanistically partitioned, so the process "reminds one of a lunatic hacking apart a pumpkin with a broadaxe" only to be astonished that "no matter what clustering routine is applied, points close together in the space (pumpkin) will often appear in the same groups (pieces hacked apart)." (Gould, 1999, 298). But that's the point. If we are to avoid constructing American gentrification as an "objectified and essentialized reality, a 'thing' operating outside the social construction of meaning" (M.P. Smith, 1999, 119), then we must deliberately contest and construct this meaning, to define a taxonomic space that reveals the context of cities shaped by distinctive configurations of neoliberal housing and social policy, federal-local relations, intersections of capital investment and disinvestment, and regional geographies of homelessness and racial-ethnic inequality. Our sketch of a revanchist urban hierarchy is a primitive first step towards understanding gentrification in its new political-economic context -- and also to mapping alternative urban futures.

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