

1 Chapter 11 1  
2 Mapping Intelligence, American 2  
3 Geographers and the Office of Strategic 3  
4 Services and GHQ/SCAP (Tokyo) 4  
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9 Trevor Barnes and Jeremy Crampton 9  
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14 **Introduction** 14  
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16 On July 13, 2010, a press release announced that the GIS company ESRI and 16  
17 the National Geospatial–Intelligence Agency (NGA) had signed a “strategic 17  
18 agreement.” ESRI would provide support for NGA’s goals of geospatial 18  
19 intelligence, or GEOINT.<sup>1</sup> The release garnered little attention, which was hardly 19  
20 surprising. ESRI CEO Jack Dangermond noted in the release that his company had 20  
21 supported the NGA for over two decades. Furthermore, his company was just one 21  
22 of many. The connections between mapping (and now GIS and geospatial data) 22  
23 and the military are now longstanding, constituting an established component 23  
24 within the tight nexus that exists among geography, the state and the armed forces. 24

25 The purpose of this chapter is to examine one part of that nexus: the role of 25  
26 geographers and cartographers in shaping, producing and disseminating national 26  
27 intelligence. After all, much intelligence is implicitly geographical if not explicitly 27  
28 so. *Inter alia* intelligence takes the form of maps, reports of surface terrain, 28  
29 knowledge of transport *infrastructure*, and descriptions of regional complexes. 29

30 But while much intelligence involves geography, few geographers were 30  
31 systematically employed in that field until the twentieth century. At least in the 31  
32 United States, the first attempt to harness the skills of geographers in gathering and 32  
33 interpreting intelligence was the Inquiry, a study group established in April 1917 33  
34 by President Woodrow Wilson to provide strategic information to government 34  
35 during World War One, and at the peace negotiations that followed. Employing 35  
36 at its peak 150 researchers across a range of disciplines, significantly it was based 36  
37 at the American Geographical Society in New York City. The geographer Isaiah 37  
38 Bowman was a key member, accompanying President Woodrow Wilson to the 38  
39 Paris Peace Conference in 1919 (Crampton 2006, Smith 2003). 39

40 40

41 41

42 1 NGA defines GEOINT as “the intelligence derived from the exploration of imagery 42  
43 and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and 43  
44 geographically referenced activities on the Earth.” 44

1 During the Second World War and its aftermath American geographers were 1  
 2 even more important and numerous within military intelligence. We focus in this 2  
 3 chapter on one arm of US intelligence during World War II in which geographers 3  
 4 played a significant role: the office of the Coordinator of Intelligence (COI) that 4  
 5 in 1942 was re-named the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The COI/OSS, 5  
 6 as the precursor of the CIA, was the crucible in which modern American secret 6  
 7 intelligence was born, producing significant geographical consequences. Moreover, 7  
 8 once the COI/OSS was dissolved in 1945, geographers who were former members 8  
 9 became involved in post-war reconstruction and development, a central theme 9  
 10 of both this collection and this chapter. The larger point is that intelligence is 10  
 11 important in making both war and peace, in destroying and renewing. While this 11  
 12 may seem paradoxical, it is hardly surprising given that in both war-making and 12  
 13 peace-making the military is central. Crucial to the operations of the military is 13  
 14 always knowledge, that is, intelligence. An army marches on information as much 14  
 15 as on its stomach. 15

16 One immediate question is the meaning of intelligence. For many it connotes 16  
 17 covert operations and spying. But this is only a small, sensationalized part. We 17  
 18 define intelligence as information explicitly collected and analyzed with a view 18  
 19 to forming or guiding tactical and strategic political interests, doctrine or policy, 19  
 20 especially those of government. In that task much useful information derives from 20  
 21 open sources. It is the purpose to which the interpretation of that information is 21  
 22 directed that is confidential not the information itself. An example discussed below 22  
 23 is the regional reports produced at OSS for the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence 23  
 24 Studies (JANIS). They were classified as CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET at the 24  
 25 time, but they were based mostly on open source information, and read like any 25  
 26 good regional monograph. Another example was “intelligence cartography,” or 26  
 27 maps of strategic zones which “resulted in the development of a type of cartography 27  
 28 hitherto essentially unknown in the government” (National Research Council 28  
 29 1946: 198). But even these maps rested upon information generally available. It 29  
 30 was the way in which they were drawn, emphasizing a particular theme, which 30  
 31 made them pieces of intelligence. 31

32 The consequence was that when COI/OSS was first established in July 1941, 32  
 33 its first task was to gather *publicly available* sources of information on which 33  
 34 intelligence interpretations could be based. In July 1942, for example, the 34  
 35 geographer Kirk Stone was sent to riffle through the holdings of Pan Am Airways 35  
 36 in San Francisco and Seattle, bringing back Pacific airline route manuals, 625 36  
 37 maps, pictures of ‘Pacific stations,’ and meteorological data.<sup>2</sup> 37

38 The purpose of our chapter is to examine the involvement of American 38  
 39 geographers in the provision of US intelligence during and immediately following 39  
 40 World War Two. It is concerned with documenting geographical practices of 40  
 41 intelligence both in wartime and in the post-war reconstructions in Europe and 41  
 42 \_\_\_\_\_ 42

43 <sup>2</sup> Kirk H. Stone to William J. Donovan, July 1 1942, RG 226 Entry 1 Box 7, Folder 43  
 44 14, NARA. 44

1 the Far East that followed. We show how the wartime experience of the OSS 1  
 2 shaped not only the personal biographies of the men involved, but also how it 2  
 3 shifted geography onto a more scientific footing although sometimes at the cost of 3  
 4 eradicating its political commitments. 4

5 We focus on a few individual American geographers involved in intelligence 5  
 6 both during and after the War, drawing upon national and personal archives to 6  
 7 reconstruct their activities. We begin with the formation of the COI/OSS, and the 7  
 8 role within it of perhaps the most well-known American geographer at the time, 8  
 9 Richard Hartshorne (1899–1992). He went to Washington DC as the founding 9  
 10 Chief of COI’s Geographical Division in September 1941. Within a month he 10  
 11 secured the services of Arthur Robinson, a graduate student in cartography at 11  
 12 Ohio State University. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, COI expanded 12  
 13 rapidly, with its Map Division employing more geographers than any other unit 13  
 14 within the organization (more than 30). Arthur Robinson was its Chief. We discuss 14  
 15 the contribution of the Map Division, and Robinson’s work in particular, to the 15  
 16 generation of geographical intelligence both during the War, and in its closing 16  
 17 stages in Europe when plans were drawn up for regional reconstruction. We focus 17  
 18 on one of them, the Morgenthau Plan. 18

19 Robinson was the second person Hartshorne hired at COI. The first was Edward 19  
 20 Ackerman, an instructor at Harvard, and specialist in environment and resources. 20  
 21 The last section of the chapter is about Ackerman. At COI Ackerman first worked 21  
 22 in the Geography Section, and after the organizational restructuring, the Europe- 22  
 23 Africa Division. In 1943 he was recalled to Harvard as an Assistant Professor to 23  
 24 teach military officers the regional geography of Japan in the School of Overseas 24  
 25 Administration. With the American occupation of Japan from September 1945, he 25  
 26 was then recruited by GHQ/SCAP (Tokyo). Headed by General MacArthur, GHQ/ 26  
 27 SCAP was at least for the first three years the government of Japan. Ackerman was 27  
 28 charged with designing environmental and resource policies for the country in the 28  
 29 post-war period. His geographical intelligence literally left its mark on Japan’s 29  
 30 recovering landscape. 30

31 \_\_\_\_\_ 31  
 32 \_\_\_\_\_ 32

### 33 **The Coordinator of Information/Office of Strategic Services (1941–45)** 33

34 \_\_\_\_\_ 34  
 35 Never before and probably never since has such a unique group of scholars 35  
 36 been assembled—historians, economists, political scientists, geographers, 36  
 37 cartographers, and others, many of them leaders in their fields (Wilson 1994: 37  
 38 72). 38

39 \_\_\_\_\_ 39  
 40 With its acronyms, codenames and spying activities—“the Farm,” Operation 40  
 41 TORCH, Agent 109, suicide pills, the “Joan-Eleanor” device, black propaganda, 41  
 42 psyops, overseas outposts in far-flung corners of the world, and special operations 42  
 43 behind enemy lines—the enormous literature on COI/OSS belies the organization’s 43  
 44 mere four-year period of official existence (1941–45). 44

1 COI/OSS began because of frustrations with interwar US intelligence. American 1  
 2 intelligence operations during that period were scattered, with no clear chain of 2  
 3 command, and subject often to vicious internecine struggles over jurisdiction. 3  
 4 Robert Murphy, a senior US diplomat at the time, called US intelligence “primitive 4  
 5 and inadequate. It was timid and parochial.”<sup>3</sup> In response, and pushed by the rise 5  
 6 of fascism and hostilities in Europe, and an expanding Japanese Empire in the 6  
 7 Far East, in July 1941 President Roosevelt created a civilian agency attached to 7  
 8 the White House, the Coordinator of Information (COI), directed to centralize 8  
 9 intelligence. COI reported directly to the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9  
 10 with its founding charter “to collect and analyze all information and data which 10  
 11 may bear upon national security” (quoted in Troy 1981: 423).<sup>4</sup> Chief of COI was 11  
 12 General William Donovan, a decorated World War I infantry battalion commander, 12  
 13 and friend to both Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill (Ford 1970; Troy 13  
 14 1981). After Pearl Harbor, COI expanded dramatically, its staff growing from 14  
 15 2,000 in 1942 to over 9,000 in 1945. Even more importantly for our purposes, 15  
 16 COI/OSS was the single most important wartime institution employing American 16  
 17 geographers, at its height 129 of them (Harris 1997). 17

18 Donovan quickly established within COI/OSS, the Research and Analysis 18  
 19 (R&A) Branch, becoming for some at least the organization’s “heart and soul” 19  
 20 (Winks 1987: 114).<sup>5</sup> Here the intellectual heavy lifting of intelligence was carried 20  
 21 out, in which geographers were prominent. For Donovan the rationale for R&A 21  
 22 was clear: 22

23  
 24 We have, scattered throughout the various departments of our government, 24  
 25 documents and memoranda concerning the military and naval and air and 25  
 26 economic potentials of the Axis which, if gathered together and studied in 26  
 27 detail by carefully selected trained minds, with knowledge both of the related 27  
 28 languages and technique would yield valuable and often decisive results.<sup>6</sup> 28  
 29 29

30 Chief of R&A was the Harvard Professor of European history, William L. Langer. 30  
 31 Employing at its height more than 900 people, R&A was based in Washington D.C. 31  
 32 Additionally, there were “R&A outposts” dotted across the globe, and discussed in 32  
 33 more detail below. 33

34  
 35  
 36  
 37 <sup>3</sup> Quoted in Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency, [http://](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/oss/art02.htm) 37  
 38 [www.cia.gov/cia/publications/oss/art02.htm](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/oss/art02.htm). 38

39 <sup>4</sup> The July 11 Executive Order that created COI, and the “Military Order of June 13, 39  
 40 1942” that transformed the COI into the OSS are reprinted as appendices in Troy (1981). 40

41 <sup>5</sup> COI consisted of five separate branches, one of which was R&A. The other four were 41  
 42 Secret Intelligence, Secret Operations, Morale Operations, and X2 (counter-intelligence). 42

43 <sup>6</sup> R&A was established on July 31st 1941, and became operational on August 27. The 43  
 44 Donovan quote is from *Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency*, 44  
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/oss/art02.htm>.

1 Perhaps the most striking feature of R&A was its extraordinarily talented staff, 1  
 2 responsible for the collection and analysis of data and information in each of the 2  
 3 wartime theatres of conflict. Initially, that staff came primarily from elite US East 3  
 4 Coast universities, but as operations expanded, their origins were more diffuse, 4  
 5 including by 1943 German émigré scholars. 5

6 All the social sciences were represented at R&A although economists, historians, 6  
 7 and geographers were the most numerous. There were three main groups of 7  
 8 academics. First, there were the established American professors like Langer, and 8  
 9 Hartshorne. Hartshorne was called to Washington in early September 1941 to be 9  
 10 Chief of the Geography Division. He was suggested by the geographer Preston 10  
 11 James at a meeting in July 1941 convened by Donovan at Harvard to discuss 11  
 12 R&A’s organization and personnel. James was there because of his commission 12  
 13 in the Military Intelligence Reserve in 1923. James’s choice of Hartshorne was 13  
 14 understandable. Hartshorne’s 1939 *The Nature of Geography* made him one of 14  
 15 America’s most well-known geographers. He was also fluent in German, having 15  
 16 spent two sabbaticals in German-speaking countries, most recently in Austria where 16  
 17 he went to study border issues just after the 1938 Nazi Anschluss (Hartshorne 1979). 17

18 Second, there was a group of young faculty, or most often graduate students, 18  
 19 who in the post-war period were to re-shape their respective disciplines. Included 19  
 20 here were Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Walter Rostow, Paul Sweezy, Edward Shils, 20  
 21 Sherman Kent, J. Barrington-Moore, Carl Schorske, Gregory Bateson, and 21  
 22 Charles Kindelberger. There were two future Nobel-prize winners, seven future 22  
 23 Presidents of the American Association of Historians, five future Presidents of the 23  
 24 American Economic Association, and three future Presidents of the Association 24  
 25 of American Geographers. Young prominent geographers within R&A included 25  
 26 Edward Ullman, Kirk Stone, Joe Spencer, Chauncey Harris, and the two we will 26  
 27 discuss in detail below, Arthur Robinson and Edward Ackerman. 27

28 The final group, and joining R&A only from mid-1943 because of security 28  
 29 worries and the drawn-out process of vetting, was a group of European expatriate 29  
 30 scholars, most often from Germany, and many from the Frankfurt School of 30  
 31 Critical Theory. Leftwing, brilliantly learned, frequently cantankerous, they 31  
 32 included Harold Deutsch, Otto Kirchheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and someone we 32  
 33 discuss in detail below Franz Neumann (Katz 1987). 33

34 Collectively this group through their talents fulfilled the mandate of the OSS, 34  
 35 the collection and analysis of all information and data bearing upon national 35  
 36 security. As Langer reflected at the end of the war, and pointing to what was to 36  
 37 follow: 37

38  
 39 Through the R&A Branch the specialized knowledge as well as the training 39  
 40 in research of American universities was for the first time made the core of 40  
 41 government service. There can be no doubt that we succeeded in pooling much 41  
 42 of the best brain power and specialized knowledge of the country as far as the 42  
 43 social sciences are concerned. The relationship of this type of government work 43  
 44 44

1 to the American universities should be maintained at all costs and the existing 1  
 2 contracts should be preserved wherever possible.<sup>7</sup> 2  
 3 3  
 4 By the war's end, R&A had assembled an enormous amount of textual material— 4  
 5 intelligence—including aerial photographs, drawings, maps and diagrams. It 5  
 6 possessed 300,000 captioned photos, 300,000 classified intelligence documents, 6  
 7 over 2 million assorted types of maps, 350,000 foreign serial publications, 50,000 7  
 8 books, thousands of biographical files, and through the prodigious efforts of 8  
 9 Wilmarth Lewis of the Central Information Divisions, 1 million 3x5 index cards 9  
 10 organized by subject, cross-indexed, and containing pictorial material. Of course, 10  
 11 this information was not static, but required continual revision. 11

12 That updating was essential in order to produce accurate intelligence material for 12  
 13 the President and Joint Chiefs, as well as assorted enquiries from military personnel in 13  
 14 the field. By the end of the war R&A produced a massive amount of written material 14  
 15 and information. There were over 3,000 research studies, 700 reports, and over 8,000 15  
 16 original maps (Smith 1983: 371). More generally, knowledge had been fashioned 16  
 17 and used to further American military and political interests. No nation had ever 17  
 18 made such systematic use of the social sciences in the gathering and interpretation of 18  
 19 military and strategic intelligence. National interests were pursued, as Donovan said, 19  
 20 through “good old fashioned intellectual sweat” (quoted by Ford 1970: 148). 20

21 The production of these materials followed a rigid and rigorous process, very 21  
 22 much adhering to the template of academic publication in scholarly journals. 22  
 23 The gatekeeper at R&A was the Projects Committee,<sup>8</sup> of which Hartshorne was 23  
 24 Chair from late November, 1942. If R&A was at the heart of OSS, the Projects 24  
 25 Committee was at the heart of R&A. It prioritized, set the standards for, and 25  
 26 reviewed all individual intelligence reports written by R&A staff. As one of the 26  
 27 many memos written by Hartshorne to set out the centrality and authority of the 27  
 28 Projects Committee put it: 28

29 29  
 30 All requests for studies are referred to the [Projects] Committee and it considers 30  
 31 all projects for studies instituted within the Branch. It assigns priorities and 31  
 32 designates what division is to be responsible and what other units should 32  
 33 cooperate or be consulted in the preparation of the work. Finally, it passes upon 33  
 34 [sic] finished reports and controls their distribution.<sup>9</sup> 34  
 35 35

36 36  
 37 <sup>7</sup> William L. Langer to William J. Donovan, Assets of the R&A Branch, 23 August 37  
 38 1945, page 1, RG 226, Box 9, Folder 3, NARA. 38

39 <sup>8</sup> The Projects Committee was the executive arm of the Board of Analysts that served 39  
 40 as an intermediary between Langer and R&A's functional intelligence divisions. The 40  
 41 Projects Committee was initiated in July 1942, but Hartshorne did not become Chair until 41  
 42 November 17 of that year. Projects Committee Minutes of Meetings, 18 November 1942, 42  
 43 RG 226, Entry 59, Box 1, NARA). 43

44 <sup>9</sup> Functions of Research & Analysis in Strategic Services, no date, RG226, Box 9, 44  
 44 Folder 3, NARA. 44

1 The Projects Committee not only controlled the topics that were written about, 1  
 2 who wrote about them, and whether they saw the light of day once they were 2  
 3 written, but also how they were written. COI/OSS was never to offer normative 3  
 4 judgment. It was to stick strictly to the facts, to be scrupulously objective. As Chair 4  
 5 of the Projects Committee, Hartshorne was the principal enforcer of objectivity, to 5  
 6 safeguard scientific standards of language, truth and logic. In a Guide he laid out 6  
 7 those standards: 7

8 It is of the utmost importance ... [to] strive for the highest degree of objectivity. 8  
 9 We should cultivate what might be called a clinical attitude ... The most obvious 9  
 10 and yet most common crime against objectivity is the use of hortatory and value 10  
 11 words and phrases. Generally speaking, “should” and “ought”—not to mention 11  
 12 “must” are taboo ... Intelligence reports find their merit in terseness and clarity 12  
 13 rather than expressive description ... Proust, Joyce, or Gertrude Stein would all be 13  
 14 equally out of place in R&A.<sup>10</sup> 14

#### 15 15 16 16 17 **Arthur Robinson, the Map Division and COI/OSS** 17 18 18

19 Arthur Robinson (1915–2004) joined COI in October 1941 at 26 earning US\$10 19  
 20 a day. By early summer 1942 he was Chief of the Cartography section, and by 20  
 21 autumn, the Chief of OSS's entire Map Division. As he told the story later, he 21  
 22 had simply been in the right place at the right time. Only because Hartshorne by 22  
 23 chance had stopped in Columbus, Ohio on his way to Washington to start at COI 23  
 24 did he meet Robinson. 24

25 The Map Division comprised of four sub-sections: Cartography, Map 25  
 26 Intelligence (MAPIS), Topographic Models, and Special Photography. It served 26  
 27 primarily JANIS and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Maps for ground forces were 27  
 28 the responsibility of the Army Map Service, AMS, and the ultra-secret or “Bigot” 28  
 29 class maps of the Normandy invasion were prepared by a map unit within the 29  
 30 Geographical Section, General Staff (British War Office). 30

31 Unusually for the time, OSS's Map Division produced many specialty or 31  
 32 thematic maps, performing research as well as map production. For example, 32  
 33 it was responsible for the maps used at the four Allied Conferences between 33  
 34 Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, as well as those for the Civil Affairs Staging 34  
 35 Areas (i.e., D-Day invasion practice sites) in California and Shrivenham, UK. Or 35  
 36 another example, maps were drawn of resource capabilities of the Axis powers. 36  
 37 Robinson's Division produced maps of German oil production capabilities, and 37  
 38 bombing ranges from Dakar (then under control of the Vichy French). Robinson 38  
 39 estimated that in total the Cartographic subdivision made 8,200 maps (about 100 39  
 40 40  
 41 41  
 42 42

43 <sup>10</sup> “Draft of proposed guide to preparation of political reports,” n.d., RG 226, Entry 43  
 44 37, Box 5, Folder 3, pages 7–10, NARA. 44

1 a month), had a personnel of 153, and distributed about 5 million map sheets 1  
2 (copies) from a collection of over 1.7 million.<sup>11</sup> 2

3 In addition to regular activities the Division also carried out side-projects. 3  
4 These included making the gores (vertical map strips that comprise a globe) for 4  
5 the remarkable 50-inch “president’s globe,” worked on by both Map Intelligence 5  
6 and Cartography with data supplied by Preston E. James. One globe was given 6  
7 to President Roosevelt, and one to Prime Minister Winston Churchill (Robinson 7  
8 1997). 8

9 One of Robinson’s most important cartographic innovations was designing a 9  
10 standardized base map that consolidated military operations across a large area, 10  
11 yet still provided details of smaller areas (Figure 11.1). Prefiguring the zoomable 11  
12 maps of Google Earth or GIS, Robinson (1979: 99) describes the procedure: 12

13  
14 One of the larger projects was the compilation, construction, and printing of the 14  
15 OSS Theater Map, a “base map,” scale 1:1,500,000, in reasonable size sheets 15  
16 (approximating those of the International Map of the World) organized so that 16  
17 any number of sheets of any area would fit together when mounted. It was to 17  
18 be used as a wall map in situation rooms on which to post the daily military 18  
19 positions and other strategic data (Robinson 1979: 99). 19  
20


21 Then, as now, one of the main problems with large amounts of data is its 21  
22 integration or interoperability. This was not just important for US or UK datasets, 22  
23 but also for the international Peace Conference. Robinson urged that the Map 23  
24 Division be responsible for the international base maps, devising a system for 24  
25 assessing the reliability and quality of the data used on them. He enabled maps 25  
26 to be standardized into a scientific system capable of continually ingesting data. 26  
27 For example, the OSS undertook aerial photography of undermapped regions 27  
28 in Western and Central Europe in spring 1945 in an operation known as “Casey 28  
29 Jones” resulting in fresh coverage of as much as two million square miles (Cave 29  
30 Brown 1982: 640). 30

### 31 *The Map Division and R&A Outposts* 31

32  
33 The Map Division not only operated in Washington DC, but maintained numerous 33  
34 overseas outposts that collected information (termed by participants, “the 34  
35 scramble for maps;” Wilson 1949: 298). Some outposts, such as the mission in 35  
36 Bern Switzerland overseen by Allen Dulles, were spy operations. And R&A Map 36  
37 Division personnel were sometimes assigned to these espionage activities, or were 37  
38 required to assess information gained from the Resistance or the Maquis. 38  
39

40 Map Division outposts could also provide important strategic intelligence. 40  
41 For example, Richard Hartshorne wrote to Donovan arguing that the India-Burma 41  
42

43 11 Memo, Arthur H. Robinson to William L. Langer, 28 September 1945. NARA, 43  
44 RG226, Entry 1, Box 6, Folder 8. 44



23 **Figure 11.1 Proposal for sectioned base map allowing standardized views** 23  
24 **of territory** 24

25 *Source:* NARA, RG226.<sup>12</sup> 25  
26

27  
28 outpost ought to continue after the war to provide “long-run political and economic 28  
29 policy for the protection of the United States interests and security” (Cave Brown 29  
30 1982: 646). But operations could be risky. In September 1945, J.R. Coolidge 30  
31 from the OSS and Map Division personnel were sent to Saigon to retrieve map 31  
32 intelligence left behind by the retreating Japanese. But while there Coolidge was 32  
33 shot and severely wounded in the neck by the Viet Minh (Vietnamese nationalists 33  
34 led by Ho Chi Minh), and given the distinction of being “the first American 34  
35 casualty in the Vietnam war” (Wilson 949).<sup>13</sup> 35  
36

37  
38  
39 12 “Proposal for Joint Departmental Production of Comprehensive Base Maps,” 38  
40 February 1944. This Report was submitted to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, by 39  
41 William Donovan, and was the outgrowth of consultation by the Map Division with the 40  
41 Library of Congress geographer Lawrence Martin. RG226, Entry 1, Box 6, Folder 9. 41

42 13 Coolidge survived, although he spent the next eight months in hospital on his 42  
43 return to the US. The first death occurred the next day when Peter Dewey, his OSS superior 43  
44 who had just visited Coolidge in hospital was ambushed by Viet Minh. In both cases there 44

1 Most outpost activity, however, was much more mundane and involved 1  
 2 either collecting maps for Washington or building a local archive to assist field 2  
 3 operations. Of the seven main Map Division outposts—London, Bern, Bari, 3  
 4 Kandy (Sri Lanka), New Delhi, Kunming and Chung King (China)—London was 4  
 5 by far the most important.<sup>14</sup> Established on 1 February 1944, it was the largest (of 5  
 6 some 60 staff, half were US personnel) and carried out both map intelligence and 6  
 7 cartography. It was the London Map Division office that issued a secret report 7  
 8 on its first two months of operations for Donovan. Leonard Wilson, its Chief, 8  
 9 divided the Division into two: cartography (mapmaking), and “map information” 9  
 10 that dealt with only published maps that were borrowed, copied and catalogued. 10  
 11 Incredible numbers of maps were processed from R&A Map Divisions 11  
 12 worldwide and sent to Washington, some 200,000 a month. To do so, the OSS 12  
 13 plundered many library collections. For example, the entire map research catalog 13  
 14 of the AGS was microfilmed. But still it wasn’t enough. Donovan went on to the 14  
 15 radio to make a nationwide appeal for receipt of yet more maps (Wilson 1949: 15  
 16 302). At one point the Map Intelligence Section (MAPIS) was so far behind in 16  
 17 cataloguing that there were ¾ million maps waiting for processing.<sup>15</sup> By war’s end 17  
 18 the OSS claimed to have the largest map intelligence library in the world.<sup>16</sup> One 18  
 19 noteworthy acquisition made towards the end of the war was in Gotha, Germany. 19  
 20 It was taken from the map publisher Justus-Perthes, and resulted resulting in nine 20  
 21 tons of material being sent to OSS-Washington. T-Force #17554, 4 April 1945 sent 21  
 22 the urgent dispatch: 22  
 23 23  
 24 109 directs that contents of the firm Justus-Perthes (at Gotha, Germany), the 24  
 25 largest map firm in the world, be obtained by OSS. All necessary steps should 25  
 26 be taken to secure the building pending arrival of the map division personnel 26  
 27 and guards should be placed over equipment. 109 authorizes Lloyd Black, Robt. 27  
 28 Hall, and John Wells be ordered to Gotha immediately for this task. He further 28  
 29 instructs that all authorization, transport and assistance be given this team. 29  
 30 Materials to be forwarded to Washington without delay.”<sup>17</sup> 30  
 31 31  
 32 32  
 33 is some evidence that the men spoke French to the Vietnamese and were mistaken for them. 33  
 34 See the firsthand account by another Indochina OSS agent, Archimedes Patti, (1980). 34  
 35 14 R&A also maintained outposts in Algiers, Cairo, Caserta, Paris, Stockholm, 35  
 36 Honolulu, Istanbul, Bucharest, Lisbon, and Athens. Map Division personnel were 36  
 37 sometimes deployed there. Memo, Arthur H. Robinson to John R. Randall, 27 February 37  
 38 1945, NARA, RG226, Entry 146, Folder 1251. 38  
 39 15 Memo, Arthur H. Robinson to William L. Langer, 6 July 1945. NARA RG226, 39  
 40 Entry 1, Box 6, Folder 8. 40  
 41 16 Memo, Arch Gerlach to Arthur H. Robinson, 7 June 1945. NARA RG 226, Entry 41  
 42 1, Box 6, Folder 8. The OSS library held some 1.3 million map sheets. Part of the citation 42  
 43 for Robinson’s Legion of Merit award was the development of a cataloguing system that 43  
 44 could adequately keep track of this collection. 44  
 45 17 NARA, RG226, Entry 99, Box 13, Folder 1. 44

1 “109” was the codename for the Director of the OSS, William Donovan. He keenly 1  
 2 recognized the importance of maps for intelligence. 2  
 3 3  
 4 4  
 5 **Reconstructing Germany and Japan** 5  
 6 6  
 7 COI/OSS was concerned not only with providing intelligence for day-to-day, field 7  
 8 operations but also thinking through larger geographical questions about the world 8  
 9 once hostilities ceased. From 1943, it was clear that the Allies would win in both 9  
 10 Europe and the Far East. But what to do with a defeated Germany and Japan? How 10  
 11 were they to be reconstructed? The OSS directly dealt with these questions, and 11  
 12 even after it was dissolved in September 1945, former OSS members, including 12  
 13 geographers, continued to contribute. 13  
 14 14  
 15 *1. Germany, the Morgenthau Plan, and the OSS* 15  
 16 16  
 17 As we now know, post-war Germany was dealt with by dividing it into zones of 17  
 18 occupation. Prefiguring the Cold War, the Soviets occupied eastern Germany, and 18  
 19 the British, Americans and French occupied various western sectors. Although 19  
 20 several official maps were produced, the most remarkable was one drafted by 20  
 21 President Roosevelt over his lunchtime. As related by Secretary of the Treasury 21  
 22 Henry Morgenthau: 22  
 23 23  
 24 In the morning when I arrived at twelve, the President was sitting alone in his 24  
 25 room with three different colored pencils and a map of Europe, and he then and 25  
 26 there sketched out where he wanted us to go and where he wanted the English to 26  
 27 go (United States Department of State 1972: 369–70). 27  
 28 28  
 29 Partition was only part of a larger, far more controversial plan for the future 29  
 30 state of Germany known as the Morgenthau Plan. Developed during 1944 by 30  
 31 Morgenthau it remains controversial even today. John Dietrich gives a stark 31  
 32 assessment: “the plan was designed to completely destroy the German economy, 32  
 33 enslave millions of her citizens, and exterminate as many as 20 million people” 33  
 34 (Dietrich 2002: 3). This admittedly revisionist argument nevertheless points 34  
 35 to the radical nature of this plan, a version of which was signed at the Quebec 35  
 36 OCTAGON Conference by Roosevelt and Churchill in September 1944. 36  
 37 The Morgenthau Plan envisaged a partitioned Germany, de-Nazification, and, 37  
 38 perhaps most controversially, stripping Germany of its industry and returning it to 38  
 39 an agrarian economy, what the *New York Times* called a “nation of small farms” 39  
 40 (Woolner 1998). Geographically Morgenthau proposed Germany ceding East 40  
 41 41  
 42 42  
 43 43  
 44 44

1 Prussia to Poland, and the Saar region to France, with the Ruhr industrial area  
2 becoming internationalized, belonging to no one (Figure 11.2)<sup>18</sup>.



23 **Figure 11.2 The Morgenthau Plan for partition of Germany, 1 September, 1944**

24 *Source:* (United States Department of State 1972).

25  
26  
27  
28 Many at R&A were appalled. Within R&A, the analysis of Germany was given  
29 over to the Central Europe subdivision, and which was where many of the German  
30 émigrés intellectuals worked (Katz 1989). They believed the Morgenthau plan  
31 would be disastrous. The Chief of the subdivision, Franz Neumann, wrote a paper  
32 providing a very different vision of a reconstructed Germany (discussed below).

33 Although the language of the Morgenthau Plan was watered down for  
34 OCTAGON where a reluctant Churchill signed on in return for an extension of  
35 the Lend-Lease program, its essential structure remained intact (United States  
36 Department of State 1972: 86 ff.). But it was during the OCTAGON summit that  
37 the OSS mounted its opposition. In the middle of the Quebec Conference, a lunch  
38 meeting was held between Shepard Morgan, scion of the banking family, Chief  
39 of the OSS London Division, and Donald McKay, a member of OSS influential  
40 Board of Analysts. Morgan was surprised to learn how much R&A had done on  
41 the disposition of Germany, and was shown a draft copy of Neumann's paper,

42  
43 <sup>18</sup> The original Plan is on file in the Roosevelt Library, available at <http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box31/t297a01.html>.

1 “Constitutional Revival of Germany.” Morgan left, “anxious to show the paper to  
2 [War] Secretary Stimson as a counter blast to the Morgenthau paper.”<sup>19</sup>

3 The contents of the Neumann draft can be compared with a paper he wrote  
4 shortly after the war (Neumann 1948). Neumann's paper is a subtle geopolitical  
5 analysis of the conditions for post-war reconstruction in Germany, as well as a  
6 warning. Rather than the punitive measures of the Morgenthau Plan, or simply  
7 using a rebuilt Germany to block the threat of an emerging Communist Soviet  
8 Union, Neumann argued that only international cooperation and full democracy  
9 would prevent Germany becoming a mere territorial pawn in a peacetime tug-of-  
10 war between East and West. He argued that Germany was unlikely to become a  
11 democracy in the near future primarily due to it being under military government.  
12 Lacking self-government, any political bodies subsequently created would remain  
13 a “mere sham” (1948: 5).

14 In the face of bad publicity, the Morgenthau Plan was allowed to fade away.  
15 Although territorial partition clearly occurred, Morgenthau's most controversial  
16 proposals were dropped. Local commanders of the Occupation Zones were handed  
17 decision-making authority. Nevertheless its effects were lasting, and may have  
18 retarded German economic recovery for as much as a decade.

## 20 2. Japan, Ackerman, COI/OSS and GHQ/SCAP (Tokyo)

21  
22 With the combination of study in political and resources geography, [Ackerman]  
23 was drawn into the urgent efforts to improve the quality of war-time intelligence  
24 and post-war reconstruction. (White 1974: 299)

25  
26 (i) *The making of an intelligence officer* Our second case is the post-war  
27 reconstruction of Japan, and involving the very first geographer Hartshorne  
28 hired at COI, Edward Ackerman (1911–1973).<sup>20</sup> Growing up an orphan in Idaho,  
29 Ackerman was a brilliant schoolboy.<sup>21</sup> From Coeur D'Alene high school he won a  
30 scholarship to Harvard in 1930. He was spotted in his first-year by Harold Kemp,  
31 an Instructor in the Department of Geology and Geography, and partner of Derwent  
32 Whittlesey, professor in human geography in the same Department. Whittlesey  
33 became Ackerman's teacher, mentor, and promoter, supervising Ackerman's PhD  
34 thesis completed in 1939 on the New England fishing industry. It was Whittlesey  
35 who also secured for Ackerman an annual Instructor position at Harvard in 1940,  
36 and who recommended him to Hartshorne at COI. Hartshorne made him Chief

37  
38  
39 <sup>19</sup> Memo, McKay to Langer, 16 Sept. 1944, NARA, RG226, Entry 1, Box 4 Folder  
40 3 “Office of the Chief, R&A”.

41 <sup>20</sup> Ackerman's papers are at the American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming  
42 at Laramie, and the basis for this section of the chapter.

43 <sup>21</sup> Ackerman's parents were first generation Swedish immigrants, but died within a  
44 year of each other when Ackerman was ten: the mother died of pneumonia caught from her  
45 son, the father from electrocution while working on the railroad.

1 of the Geographical Reports Section in the Geographical Division in September, 1  
2 1941. 2

3 His responsibilities were “the planning and reviewing of studies made by an 3  
4 increasing [Geographical Division] staff.”<sup>22</sup> Those studies provided intelligence 4  
5 about particular regions within the various theatres of war, ranging from 5  
6 assessments of beaches for possible troop landings to evaluating political and 6  
7 cultural sympathies of native residents. After COI’s 1942 internal restructuring 7  
8 that organized the analysis of intelligence geographically,<sup>23</sup> and its renaming as 8  
9 the OSS, Ackerman was made Chief of the Topographical Intelligence subdivision 9  
10 of the Europe-Africa Division (the biggest and most important of the Divisions 10  
11 headed by Sherman Kent, “the father of intelligence,”<sup>24</sup> and containing those 11  
12 sometimes-contrarian former Frankfurt school members including Neumannn). 12  
13 Ackerman was a superb administrator, “reading at lightning pace, ... never forgetting 13  
14 anything,”<sup>25</sup> and with an uncanny “ability to secure the right men for his own 14  
15 section, and to maintain their morale at a high level under trying circumstances.”<sup>26</sup> 15  
16 But he was also an outstanding scholar, concerned with re-conceiving the role of 16  
17 geography within the state-military nexus in which it and he were being put to use. 17

18 The initial Geographical Reports he supervised, and later those done under 18  
19 him at Topographical Intelligence, became the basis for the Joint Army Navy 19  
20 Intelligence Surveys (JANIS), and later still became the CIA World Factbook.<sup>27</sup> 20  
21 The idea of JANIS was “to make available in one publication ... all the necessary 21  
22 detailed information upon which may be based a war plan ... in a given area.”<sup>28</sup> As 22  
23 a publication it was first mooted in the summer 1942, and a template drawn up for 23  
24 the volumes. But following criticism that it was insufficiently sensitive to “actual 24  
25 25

26 \_\_\_\_\_ 26  
27 22 E. Ackerman, “Biographical Data Concerning Dr. Edward Augustus Ackerman,” 27  
28 no date, Box 38, “1940–1942,” Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American 28  
29 Heritage Center, University of Wyoming at Laramie. 29

30 23 The move involved tilting R&A away from disciplinary based research to 30  
31 regionally based research organized according to four geographical blocks: Europe-Africa, 31  
32 USSR, Latin America, and the Far East. 32

33 24 Central Intelligence Agency, Featured story archive, “A look back ... Sherman 33  
34 Kent: the father of intelligence,” [https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-](https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/sherman-kent-the-father-of-intelligence.html) 33  
35 [archive/2010-featured-story-archive/sherman-kent-the-father-of-intelligence.html](https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/sherman-kent-the-father-of-intelligence.html) 34  
36 (accessed on August 9, 2010). 35

36 25 D. Whittlesey to Dean K. N. Murdock, March 1, 1935, Box 38, “1934–1939,” 36  
37 Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage Center, University of 37  
38 Wyoming at Laramie. 38

39 26 D. Whittlesey to President J. P. Baxter, December 8, 1940, Box 28, “1940–1942,” 39  
40 Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage Center, University of 40  
41 Wyoming at Laramie. 41

42 27 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/history.html> 41  
42 (accessed August 9, 2010). 42

43 28 Memo: War and Navy Department and OSS, July 1 1943, RG 226, Entry 1, Box 43  
44 1, Folder 2, NARA. 44

1 areal descriptions,” it was redrafted, and finally an acceptable “Outline Guide” 1  
2 was agreed in April 1943 (albeit modified further over time).<sup>29</sup> 2

3 The initial board overseeing JANIS, the Joint Intelligence Studies Publishing 3  
4 Board (JISPB), early on had its problems. The first OSS representative on the 4  
5 Board, the geographer Kirk Stone, complained to Hartshorne that “perhaps this 5  
6 Board should be dissolved ... before ... it unduly wastes money that could go 6  
7 to the production of bullets rather than second-rate intelligence.”<sup>30</sup> But things 7  
8 improved once the dyspeptic Stone left, and Ackerman’s good OSS friend (and 8  
9 another geographer) Edward Ullman replaced him. Ullman subsequently brought 9  
10 in Ackerman (who by then had returned to Harvard—see below) as a consultant 10  
11 to revise significantly the JANIS regional geographical intelligence blue print. 11  
12 In June 1944 Ackerman provided a 19-page memo with detailed suggestions for 12  
13 change, and very much in-line with Ullman’s own sensibilities.<sup>31</sup> The problem with 13  
14 JANIS reports were that they had become an “encyclopaedic regional anthology,” 14  
15 they needed to become more focussed, topical, systematic and specialized.<sup>32</sup> As 15  
16 Ullman later wrote to Ackerman summarizing their discussions, if JANIS “tries 16  
17 to cover everything, it will produce ... a mess. On the other hand, there are some 17  
18 adjustments that could be made towards producing as good geography of foreign 18  
19 areas as possible for use by the US government.”<sup>33</sup> Those adjustments involved a 19  
20 more organized approach, or a functional approach as Ullman sometimes called 20  
21 it. Contributors needed to be specialists, and which “allowed workers trained in 21  
22 specific fields to concentrate on the field they knew .... The result is a better, 22  
23 more useful product than the previous Strategic Surveys and ONI [Office of 23  
24 Naval Intelligence] Monographs.” Ackerman, along with Ullman, were in 24  
25 JANIS redefining the character of geographical intelligence, moving it from the 25  
26 butterfly collection of disconnected facts, to something more targeted and incisive, 26  
27 conceptually chiseled by a sharper, more directed thematic purpose. Sherman 27  
28 Kent was sometimes aghast at what geographers did in the name of intelligence, 28  
29 29

30 29 Memo: Proposed outline for Joint Strategic Monographs, William L. Langer to all 30  
31 section heads, July 27, 1942, RG 226, Box 1, Folder 3, NARA. Memo: Proposed outline for 31  
32 Joint Strategic Monographs, George Brightman to Richard Hartshorne, August 13, 1942, 32  
33 RG 226, Box 1, Folder 3, NARA. 33

34 30 Kirk Stone to Richard Hartshorne, 13 July 1943, RG 226, Box 1, Folder 20, 34  
35 NARA. 35

36 31 Memo: E. A. Ackerman to Lt. E. L. Ullman, “Report on examination of past JANIS 36  
37 publications and present recommended research procedures,” June 1944, Box 14B, no file 37  
38 name, Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930/1973, American Heritage Center, University of 38  
39 Wyoming at Laramie. 39

40 32 Memo: E. A. Ackerman to Lt. E. L. Ullman, “Report on examination of past 40  
41 JANIS publications and present recommended research procedures,” page 2. June 1944, 40  
41 Box 14B, no file name, Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage 41  
42 Center, University of Wyoming at Laramie. 42

43 33 Edward L. Ullman to Edward Ackerman, 2 January, 1946, Ullman Papers, 43  
44 University of Washington, Seattle, Box 1, Folder 17. 44

1 calling them in his despondent moments “unemployable” (Ullman 1980: 219). But 1  
 2 Ackerman and Ullman’s work on JANIS justified their payroll.<sup>34</sup> 2  
 3 3 3  
 4 (ii) *How to be an occupier: The School of Overseas Administration* Geographical 4  
 5 intelligence clearly counted. It counted also in another way when in early June 5  
 6 1943, Harvard’s Dean Paul Buck wrote to Langer at R&A requesting the return 6  
 7 of Ackerman to the College. Buck realized that “the loss to you would be quite a 7  
 8 blow,”<sup>35</sup> but Ackerman had already stayed a year longer at COI/OSS than initially 8  
 9 agreed. Moreover, as Buck continued, 9  
 10 10  
 11 The University itself has war functions to perform and certain members of 11  
 12 its staff are essential to discharging these functions. The War Department has 12  
 13 now asked us to develop training programs for Civil Affairs Specialists and for 13  
 14 the advance phase of Area and Languages. These programs are rated high in 14  
 15 importance by the War Department. They require a great deal of geography of a 15  
 16 high order .... The return of Dr. Ackerman to us is essential ....<sup>36</sup> 16  
 17 17  
 18 Indeed, he was. In 1943 the School of Overseas Administration was opened at 18  
 19 Harvard charged with the task of “preparing officers for military government 19  
 20 service in occupied territory” (Hyneman 1944: 342). The scheme began in 20  
 21 spring, 1942, at the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, 21  
 22 Charlottesville. But “it soon became apparent that the demand for officers trained 22  
 23 for civil affairs would run far beyond the [School’s] capacity” (Hyneman 1944: 23  
 24 342). Consequently, in 1943 the Civil Affairs Training Program (CATP) was 24  
 25 launched, and offered at ten universities across the country, including Harvard, 25  
 26 and which ran it from its new School of Overseas Administration. The program 26  
 27 was geared toward providing everything anyone needed to know to practice 27  
 28 military government in an occupied territory either in Europe or in the Far East. 28  
 29 Instruction was offered in the techniques of state administration, language, and 29  
 30 area studies (“useful knowledge and points of view about certain foreign people 30  
 31 31  
 32 34 The Citation on the Certificate of Merit that Ackerman received for his OSS 32  
 33 wartime contributions emphasized “the unique role [he played] in the program of outlines 33  
 34 for the JANIS studies, which achieved such vital utilization in the strategic planning of 34  
 35 military operations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.... Partly as a result of his achievement 35  
 36 JANIS became accepted as the standard topographical study of US Military Forces, and its 36  
 37 use has been so widespread that the JANIS outline forms the basis for the new instructions 37  
 38 to military and naval attachés for gathering topographical and related information in foreign 38  
 39 areas ....” Quoted in a letter from D. Whittlesey to Dean P. Buck, March 7, 1947, Box 39  
 40 38, “1943–1947,” Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage Center, 40  
 41 University of Wyoming at Laramie. 41  
 42 35 Dean P. H. Buck to W. L. Langer, June 3rd, 1943, Box 38, “1943–1947,” Ackerman, 42  
 43 Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming at 43  
 44 Laramie. 43  
 44 36 Op. cit. 44

1 and the characteristics of and conditions prevailing in certain foreign countries,” 1  
 2 Hyneman 1944: 342–3). 2  
 3 Initially, the European and Far Eastern programs were the same length, 16 3  
 4 weeks. But later they diverged, with instructions for practicing military occupation 4  
 5 in Europe shrinking to two months, but in the Far East expanding to beyond 5  
 6 four months. In both programs, area studies were the “most important feature of 6  
 7 instruction” (Hyneman 1944: 343). It was undertaking this “most important” task 7  
 8 that Ackerman was recalled from OSS. Promoted from Instructor to Assistant 8  
 9 Professor, he was to teach at the School of Overseas Administration the geography 9  
 10 of Japan to large classes of officers, up to 400 at a time. He had no prior interest in 10  
 11 Japan, though, and while he took lessons in Japanese he never listed it afterwards 11  
 12 as one of his languages.<sup>37</sup> The very day after Japan surrendered, he also wrote 12  
 13 Charles Colby, Professor of Geography at Chicago, that “too much of my time 13  
 14 has been devoted in the last two years to lecturing about things in which I am a 14  
 15 mere beginner.”<sup>38</sup> That did not stop him, though, from accepting an invitation from 15  
 16 the War Department made in the spring of 1946 to go to Japan as an adviser to 16  
 17 the Natural Resources Section within the US military government of occupation 17  
 18 under General Douglas MacArthur.<sup>39</sup> 18  
 19 19  
 20 (iii) *The occupation and reconstruction of Japan* The first time that the vast 20  
 21 majority of Japanese ever heard Emperor Hirohito speak was when following the 21  
 22 bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki he came on the wireless at 12:00 noon on 22  
 23 August 15, 1945, to say that Japan was surrendering to the Allies. “The War had 23  
 24 not necessarily developed in our favor,” and the Japanese people must now be 24  
 25 25  
 26 26  
 27 27  
 28 37 Ackerman’s 1956 “United Nations Personal History” lists five languages that he 28  
 29 can at least read, but Japanese is not among them. “Edward A. Ackerman Bibliography,” 29  
 30 Box 1, Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage Center, University of 30  
 31 Wyoming at Laramie. 31  
 32 38 Japan surrendered to the US on August 15, but because of a difference in the time 32  
 33 zones VJ Day was declared in the US on August 14. E. A. Ackerman to C. G. Colby, August 33  
 34 15, 1945, Box 38, “1943–1947,” Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American 34  
 35 Heritage Center, University of Wyoming at Laramie. 35  
 36 39 There is some evidence that Ackerman was overly modest in his self-assessment of 36  
 37 his knowledge of Japan. The Associate Director of the School of Overseas Administration, 37  
 38 Lauriston Ward, wrote a letter in support of Ackerman for his promotion to Associate 38  
 39 Professor at Harvard extolling his expertise both in the class room and on panel discussions. 39  
 40 On one occasion in a discussion about the sufficiency of Japan’s internal resources for 40  
 41 economic growth, Ward remembered Ackerman arguing against his more mature and 41  
 42 experienced panel members: “he stood up in his boots and so quietly and brilliantly 42  
 43 supported his thesis that everyone present felt that he had made his case.” L. Ward to Dean 43  
 44 P. Buck, June 14, 1947, Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage 44  
 44 Center, University of Wyoming at Laramie. 44

1 prepared “to endure the unendurable, to bear the unbearable.”<sup>40</sup> American troops 1  
 2 had landed in Japan in early September, taking control of its government. The head 2  
 3 of that new military administration, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers 3  
 4 (SCAP), the American General Douglas MacArthur, ostensibly represented four 4  
 5 nations (China, Russia, the US and the UK). But over the next nearly seven years 5  
 6 of occupation (the Americans officially left Japan in April, 1952), he represented 6  
 7 only one: the United States. Especially during the first two or three years of 7  
 8 occupation, MacArthur exerted absolute control, becoming “a minor potentate in 8  
 9 his Far Eastern domain” as John Dower (1999: 79) writes. 9

10 But MacArthur was a generally benign potentate, and, if not oxymoronic, 10  
 11 a politically progressive one.<sup>41</sup> The changes he enacted were enormous. Dower 11  
 12 (2002: xx) says that under MacArthur Japan was “subject to one of the most 12  
 13 audacious exercises in social engineering in history. Substantive reformist policies 13  
 14 were introduced into virtually every level of society.” There was a massive land 14  
 15 redistribution from a small class of feudal landowners to a very large class of 15  
 16 peasant tenants, Japanese women were given the vote as well as a series of 16  
 17 civil rights, trade unions were legalized, there was significant constitutional 17  
 18 and educational reform, and at least initially the large conglomerate trading 18  
 19 companies—the *zaibatsu*—that previously ruled the economy with an iron grip 19  
 20 began to be broken up. 20

21 In addition, MacArthur and his more than 4,700 staff, many of the officers of 21  
 22 whom were trained at the School of Military Occupation or one of its branch plant 22  
 23 campuses, substantially directed the reconstruction of a decimated, war-blighted 23  
 24 nation.<sup>42</sup> And decimated it was: 2.7 million Japanese died during the War, four-fifths 24  
 25 of Japan’s ships were sunk, one third of all of its industrial machines were destroyed, 25  
 26 65% of Tokyo’s buildings were razed, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 26  
 27 blown to oblivion, 30% of the population were homeless, and in the year following 27  
 28 the end of the War living standards fell by 35% in cities, and 65% in the country 28  
 29 (Dower 1999: 44–5). When he disembarked from the USS Missouri after officiating 29  
 30 at the Japanese surrender, and saw the ruins of Tokyo for himself, MacArthur said 30  
 31 Japan had become a “fourth-rate nation” (Dower 1999: 44). 31  
 32 32

33 40 The Emperor’s high-pitched, wispy voice in combination with his archaic, indirect 33  
 34 prose meant that many of his listeners remained ignorant of Japan’s surrender even after 34  
 35 the noontime announcement. The quotation from Hirohito’s speech is taken from Dower 35  
 36 1999: 36. 36

37 41 In his brilliant book about the American occupation of Japan, *Embracing* 37  
 38 *Defeat*, John Dower (1999: 23) says MacArthur’s acts as Supreme Commander were “a 38  
 39 remarkable display of arrogant idealism—both self-righteous and genuinely visionary.” 39  
 40 Their progressive political character was achieved in spite of MacArthur’s barely muffled 40  
 41 Christian missionary zeal, Orientalism, and a colonial jingoism that conceived the remaking 41  
 42 of Japan as yet another of “the white man’s burdens.” 42

43 42 There was over 4,700 staff in 1948 (its maximum). They included 216 officers, 312 42  
 43 enlisted military personnel, 2,226 civilians (including Ackerman), and 1987 Japanese civilians 43  
 44 who were secretaries, typists, translators, and research assistants (Takemae 2002: 141). 44

1 One of MacArthur’s advisors, General Charles Willoughby, (“my pet fascist,” 1  
 2 MacArthur called him; Gordon 2009: 237) counseled minimal intervention. But 2  
 3 MacArthur could not help himself. From 10:30 a.m. each morning (his “movements 3  
 4 were as predictable as a metronome,” Dower 1999: 205) at General Head Quarters 4  
 5 (GHQ) on the sixth floor of the Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Building, Tokyo, 5  
 6 MacArthur took to reconstructing Japan with “a messianic fervor” (Dower 1999: 6  
 7 23; Takemae 2002: 65). Given “an unusually free hand” by Washington (Dower 7  
 8 1999: 79), he and his staff at GHQ SCAP formed a shadow government. Decisions 8  
 9 that they made about the constitution as well as the Constitution of the new Japan 9  
 10 through the Central Liaison Office<sup>43</sup> were handed on to Japanese bureaucrats and 10  
 11 elected politicians for enactment and implementation (Schaller 1985: 28). GHQ 11  
 12 SCAP was organized as a mirror copy of Japanese Government Ministries and 12  
 13 bureaucratic departments, with 12 separate sections. It was an arrangement that 13  
 14 allowed the most efficient conversion of decisions made by GHQ into Japanese 14  
 15 government policy and legislation. 15

16 Of course, this procedure of government by fiat was fraught with problems, not 16  
 17 least of which was that those serving in the US military government of occupation 17  
 18 were sometimes quite ignorant about the country they were reconstructing. That 18  
 19 might have included MacArthur who made only two trips outside of Tokyo during 19  
 20 the entire time he was Supreme Commander. He seemed uninterested in knowing 20  
 21 about the country he was changing. Such an attitude was also reflected in some 21  
 22 of his senior staff. One colonel said, “If you know too much about Japan, you 22  
 23 might be too prejudiced. We do not like old Japan hands” (quoted by Dower 1999: 23  
 24 224). That said, as Schaller (1985: 28) suggests, most of “the lower staff positions, 24  
 25 where most real supervision took place, were filled by more qualified candidates.” 25  
 26 This is also confirmed by Takemae’s (2002: xxviii; and also 146) meticulous 26  
 27 study of *Inside GHQ*: “Many military officers [at GHQ] held advanced degrees 27  
 28 and had received up to a year’s intensive training in civil administration and 28  
 29 the Japanese language at leading American universities.” That’s what Harvard’s 29  
 30 School of Overseas Administration was all about. Ackerman, of course, was one 30  
 31 of those “more qualified candidates.” While his self-assessment of his knowledge 31  
 32 of Japan might have been only that of a “mere beginner,” with his doctoral degree, 32  
 33 prior experience at OSS, and teaching for two years at Harvard about the Far 33  
 34 East, including in 1946 the publication of two substantial chapters about Japan 34  
 35 (Ackerman 1946a and b), he was in comparison to many others a full blown 35  
 36 expert, and eager to put into practice his geographical intelligence. 36  
 37 37

38 (iv) *Ackerman in Japan* Ackerman arrived in Japan in July 1946, returning to 38  
 39 Harvard in February 1948, and followed by a second shorter stint from August 39  
 40 1948 to January 1949. He was based in the Natural Resources Section (NRS) at 40  
 41 41  
 42 43 Takemae (2002: 113) describes the Central Liaison Office (CLO) as “a central 42  
 43 clearing house and message center, the CLO transmitted SCAP policies into action and 43  
 44 assuring that Occupation reforms proceeded smoothly.” 44

1 GHQ SCAP, and which had its parallel in the Japanese government (“The Natural  
2 Resources Committee” and which Ackerman helped to establish in 1947). NRS  
3 was inaugurated on October 2, 1945, charged with “advising SCAP on resource  
4 policy for agriculture, fisheries, forestry, mining and geology in Japan, Korea,  
5 and Japan’s former Pacific territories” (Takema 2002: 188). It was headed by Lt.  
6 Colonel Hubert G. Schenck, a former geology professor at Stanford, who oversaw  
7 a staff of 265.

8 The NRS’s “day in the sun,” as Takemae (2002: 148) puts it, was its involvement  
9 in land redistribution. Japanese agriculture until the end of World War II was  
10 effectively a feudal system, one that “kept the producing tenant majority in a  
11 state of unrelieved misery” (Takemae 2002: 307). Half of the Japanese population  
12 worked on the land, and half of them were peasant farmers (Schaller 1985: 42–3).  
13 With the redistribution policy introduced by NRS, “over several years more than  
14 one third of land changed hands, which affected 30% of all Japanese” (Schaller  
15 1985: 43).

16 While land redistribution was the big ticket item, NRS had other responsibilities  
17 including managing food and fuel emergencies, undertaking an inventory of  
18 Japan’s natural resources that involved hundred of NRS surveys, and Ackerman’s  
19 responsibility with a dozen staff members to assess Japan’s resource production  
20 potential in relation to its needs, and to devise policies to make the most efficient  
21 use of the limited resources it possessed.

22 The result was the publication on December 31, 1949, of his two-volume, 559  
23 pages, *A Report on Japan’s Natural Resources*. It took close to three years to  
24 research and write, with contributions from 200 technical experts. But only 57  
25 copies were made, and then given only to a limited number of readers (Ackerman  
26 1953: ix). Three years later, however, the University of Chicago Press published  
27 an amended version, *Japan’s Natural Resources and their Relation to Japan’s  
28 Economic Future* (Ackerman 1953).

29 The *Report* is a sophisticated how-to manual for Japanese post-war  
30 reconstruction, for its *Economic Future*. Ackerman’s solution, and a theme taken  
31 up in his later general academic writings about geography from the late 1950s  
32 and early 1960s, is science and technology (Ackerman 1958, 1965). His answer  
33 for Japan is a version of the modernization thesis. Given the end of future growth  
34 and the limited means available to achieve it, success will come from rational  
35 intervention, from the application of science and technology.

36 The first part of the *Report* is a forensic accounting of Japan’s natural  
37 resources: food production including fisheries, energy, sources of fiber including  
38 forests, and mineral deposits. Again and again, though, Japan falls short: “If the  
39 production of present Japanese resources is considered in relation to requirements,  
40 one encounters a long list of deficiencies with only rare and minor exceptions  
41 of adequate production” (Ackerman 1953: 320). The problem is painfully clear:  
42 insufficient means given the ends. The answer: to be modernist, to be more  
43 efficient with those scarce means, and facilitated by science and technology. This  
44 technocratic approach meshed exactly with a larger national policy celebrating

1 science and technology. Vannevar Bush, one of the key US science managers in  
2 the post-war period, had published in 1945, *Science: The Endless Frontier*, and the  
3 President of Ackerman’s university, James Conant (1948: 77), said in 1947 there is  
4 “special sense in which science is called upon to help out with national problems.”  
5 It was no wonder then that Ackerman wrote in his report about Japan:  
6  
7 The economic future of Japan in large measure rests with its research scientists,  
8 engineers, technologists and technicians. Without their contribution, increases in  
9 the production of food, fibers, minerals or other materials will be a empty hope,  
10 no matter how well intentioned and earnest the remainder of the people. Hope  
11 for more effective use of materials likewise rests with science and technology.  
12 (Ackerman 1953: 537)  
13

14 This is Ackerman’s blueprint for a reconstructed Japan, for bringing it into  
15 the twentieth century. A failure to do so, as he pointedly argues at least in the  
16 1953 version of the *Report*, potentially means a return to the old Japan, to the  
17 Imperial Japan. “One day the existence or absence of [modernist] projects may  
18 mean the difference between a democratic and autocratic Japan” (Ackerman  
19 1953: 574). If ever there was a reason to reconstruct Japan this was it. When Lt.  
20 Colonel Schenk wrote to Ackerman at the end of his contract to thank him for his  
21 *Report*’s “remarkable contribution,” he said it “will aid not only those Americans  
22 responsible for writing the peace treaty, but also those Japanese charged with better  
23 management and use of Nippon’s meager resources.”<sup>44</sup> Such are the consequences  
24 of a geographical intelligence.

25  
26  
27 **Conclusion**  
28

29 Using intelligence for military strategic purposes goes back at least to the Punic  
30 Wars, 250 BCE, probably before then. And a central part of intelligence has always  
31 been geographical intelligence: knowing the topography of a battlefield, who is  
32 where, the natural resources available, the pattern of roads, paths and bridges, the  
33 dead-ends and impassable terrain, the location of population centers, and so much,  
34 much more. The map is one distinctive contribution of geographical intelligence,  
35 but so is the regional monograph, the locational analysis of industry, the political  
36 geography of borders, and the environmental resource assessment.

37 Geographers can be caught up within intelligence either directly, as described  
38 in this chapter, or indirectly when their work is taken up, and (unknowingly) used  
39 by those in the formal intelligence community. But in spite of this inevitability,  
40 geographical intelligence is rarely spoken about publicly in the discipline, instead  
41  
42  
43  
44

44 Lt. Colonel Schenck to E. A. Ackerman, May 8 1948, “1948,” Box 38, Ackerman,  
43 Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming at  
44 Laramie.

1 consigned to an underworld existence, the place where secrets are buried. While we 1  
 2 might have little choice about how our work is used as geographical intelligence, 2  
 3 we do have some choice about whether we know about its use. 3  
 4 Recent works by Gregory (2004) on US military involvement in contemporary 4  
 5 Iraq and Afghanistan, by Perkins and Dodge (2009) and Paglen (2009) on covert 5  
 6 national spaces are starting to reveal some of the secrets of the underworld. 6  
 7 Our chapter has focused on the origins and continued influence of the first 7  
 8 centralized intelligence agency in the USA. This came surprisingly late, certainly 8  
 9 well after those in countries such as the United Kingdom. But like the UK 9  
 10 extensive intelligence network in support of the British Empire, the rise of the 10  
 11 OSS coincides with the rise of the USA as a global geopolitical power. As with 11  
 12 the Inquiry a quarter century earlier the COI/OSS relied heavily on academics, 12  
 13 including cartographers and geographers. Geographers not only shaped the nature 13  
 14 of the intelligence and how it affected and directed post-war reconstruction in 14  
 15 Germany and Japan, but so too was the discipline affected. What is more, both 15  
 16 intelligence and science were depoliticized in the process. Ironically, given that 16  
 17 OSS was a government agency, its geographers emerged with the view that power 17  
 18 and knowledge could be separated. As we pointed out at the beginning of the 18  
 19 chapter, today the mangling of intelligence and disciplinary knowledges such 19  
 20 as GIS continues unabated. Our chapter therefore is a contribution to a critical 20  
 21 examination of geographical intelligences. 21  
 22 22  
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